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The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
in Illinois
I. INTRODUCTION
Although many trial judges are averse to a general discussion of
the subject,I there is an unmistakable trend in the increased use of
scientific evidence at trial.2 This trend has generated a critical
evaluation of the standards used in determining the admissibility of
such evidence. Many courts follow the rule of admissibility set
forth in Frye v. United States,3 while some do not follow it at all. 4
Most courts, however, apply their own particularized version of
the Frye standard.5 Although Illinois has adopted the Frye test, it
has failed to apply it regularly.6 Moreover, Illinois courts do not
always use the same interpretation of the test even when they do
choose to apply it.7 This lack of uniformity has created conflicting
legal standards and has caused confusion among the courts.
First, this Comment will provide an historical review of the Frye
standard, including its application in jurisdictions other than Illi-
nois. Next, this Comment will discuss the Illinois approach to sci-
entific evidence, noting that it has left both judges and attorneys in
a quandary over when novel scientific evidence should be admitted.
Finally, this Comment will critique the Frye standard as it has been
1. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: An Alternative To The Frye Rule,
25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 545 n.2 (1984) (citing Symposium on Science and the Rules of
Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 220-21 (1983)). A six-year veteran of judicial conferences re-
ported that, of all the topics discussed, "none was as unpopular with the judges as scien-
tific evidence .... No matter how hard we tried, we could not elicit any excitement
about the Frye test. They acted as if the issue just did not come up in their courtrooms."
Id. See infra note 3 (Frye standard set forth).
2. The National Center for State Courts has conducted a nation-wide survey in which
almost half of the participating judges and attorneys stated that they encounter scientific
evidence in approximately one-third of their trials. Imwinkelried, The Standard For Ad-
mitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique From the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL.
L. REv. 554 (1982-83) (citing Study to Investigate Use of Scientific Evidence, 7 NAT'L L.
CENTER FOR S. Cis. REP. 1 (Aug. 1980)).
3. The Frye standard imposes on proponents of novel scientific evidence the burden of
establishing that the scientific technique or principle in question has "gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See infra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1019.
5. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 154-84 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
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employed in Illinois and will suggest an alternative approach based
on the Federal Rules of Evidence.
II. BACKGROUND: FRYE V. UNITED STATES AND THE
"GENERAL ACCEPTANCE STANDARD"
In assessing the admissibility of evidence in the federal court sys-
tem, the court's threshold determination must be whether the evi-
dence is relevant.8 Relevant evidence is that "having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the de-
termination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would have been without the evidence." 9 Courts must exclude rel-
evant evidence, however, if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading
the jury.
0
1
Although most evidence need fulfill only this relevancy require-
ment, courts historically have required that novel scientific evi-
dence"1  satisfy an additional criterion. 2  This additional
requirement is premised upon the belief that factfinders are likely
to perceive scientific evidence as infallible13 and thus place inordi-
nate credence in its results. 14 The first court to recognize the need
8. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 184-85, at 540-48 (3d ed. 1984).
9. FED. R. EVID. 401.
10. FED. R. EVID. 403.
11. A precise definition of what constitutes "scientific evidence" is curiously absent
from court opinions and commentaries. One commentator has defined novel scientific
evidence as that produced from "newly ascertained or applied scientific principles." Gi-
annelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Cen-
tury Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1198 (1980). This definition is somewhat circular,
however, because it is unclear what constitutes a scientific principle. See also infra notes
164-68 and accompanying text (brief discussion of what constitutes scientific evidence in
Illinois).
12. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 203, at 605 ("[t]he most common special rule is
that... the proponent must show general acceptance of the principle or technique in the
scientific community.")
13. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Writing for a
three member dissent, Justice Blackmun stated, "[i]ndeed, unreliable scientific evidence is
widely acknowledged to be prejudicial. The reasons for this are manifest. 'The major
danger of scientific evidence is its potential to mislead the jury; an aura of scientific infal-
libility may shroud the evidence and thus lead the jury to accept it without critical scru-
tiny.' "Id. at 926 (citing Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1197). See United States v. Addison,
498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (jurors tend to attribute a "mystic infallibility" to
scientific testimony); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (1978) (noting
the "apparent objectivity" that sophisticated mechanical devices sometimes generate);
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1976)
(jurors often overestimate the certainty of scientific evidence). See Imwinkelried, supra
note 2, at 554 (further discussion of the impact of scientific evidence upon jurors).
14. According to a survey of jury attitudes, about one-fourth of jurists presented with
scientific evidence believed that, had such evidence been absent, their verdict would have
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for special rules to govern scientific evidence was Frye v. United
States.'" The appellant in Frye, a convicted murderer, sought to
introduce evidence that he had passed a systolic blood pressure de-
ception test, a forerunner of the modern polygraph lie detector. 6
The Frye court refused to admit the evidence, stating that in order
for novel scientific evidence to be admissible, its technique and un-
derlying principle must be generally accepted in the relevant scien-
tific community:'
7
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle of discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."' 8
The Frye court failed to cite precedent or identify a particular
rationale for its decision;19 yet most courts have adopted the "gen-
eral acceptance" requirement without question.20 The Frye stan-
been not guilty instead of guilty. Pearson, Ryan, Houlden & Mihajlovic, The Uses and
Effects of Forensic Science in the Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730,
1748 (1987).
15. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
16. Id. See infra note 22 (description of the polygraph test). Years after the defend-
ant in Frye was convicted, another person confessed to the murder. Wicker, The Poly-
graphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711, 715 (1953) (citing
14TH ANN. REP. OF THE N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL 265 (1948)).
17. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
18. Id.
19. Note, Different Standards and Conflicting Results: A Re-Evaluation of the Frye
Test For Admitting Novel Scientific Evidence in Light of Decisions Involving Spectro-
graphic Evidence Introduction, 5 REV. LITIGATION 327, 329 (1986) (citing 22 C. WRIGHT
& K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5168, at 87 (1978)). See also
Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 254, 257 (1984).
20. Many cases cite Frye without comment or analysis. See United States v. Zieger,
350 F. Supp. 685, 687 n.6 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting the
lack of a Frye standard discussion in federal decisions); People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App.
2d 124, 127-28, 219 P.2d 70, 72-73 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 888 (1951) (lie detector
test held inadmissible); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 52-55, 230 P.2d 495, 502-
05, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951) (same); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 657-59, 246
N.W. 314, 317 (1933) (same). See also Rivers v. Black, 259 Ala. 528, 531, 68 So. 2d 2, 4-
5 (1953) ("drunkometer" test subject to Frye-type analysis); Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d
339, 340-41 (Fla. 1952) (lie detector test held inadmissible); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb.
368, 377, 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949) (same). Furthermore, once the standard was
adopted by a particular jurisdiction, the standard was, for the most part, applied selec-
tively. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 451-52, 391 A.2d 364, 403 (1978) ("[t]he standard
used by courts generally for the admission of evidence in such matters as fingerprints,
ballistics, intoxication tests, and X-rays is substantially different from that enunciated in
Frye"); Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1219-21 ("[T]he selective application of the general
1990]
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dard is now generally referred to as the traditional standard of
admissibility for novel scientific evidence2 and has been used to
determine the admissibility of evidence derived from polygraph lie
detector tests,2 2 voiceprints, 23 residue tests,24 bite mark compari-
acceptance standard is one of its most notable features"). In the cases involving poly-
graph tests, however, courts have been consistent in their application of the Frye stan-
dard. McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67
IOWA L. REv. 879, 884 (1982).
21. Giannelli, Background Paper Prepared For the National Conference of Lawyers
and Scientists, 99 F.R.D. 189, 198 (1983); see Reed, 283 Md. at 382, 391 A.2d at 368
("This criterion of general acceptance in the scientific community has come to be the
standard in almost all of the courts in the country .... ); cf Rossi, Modern Evidence
and the Expert Witness, 12 LITIGATION 18, 20 (1985) ("Within the last decade, courts in
more than 15 jurisdictions have rejected Frye.")
22. The polygraph monitors several autonomic physiological functions (such as pulse
rate, blood pressure, respiration, and perspiration) of the subject as he responds to ques-
tioning. The subject is judged to be lying when the autonomic disturbance exceeds a
certain point. See J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH
("LIE DETECTION") TECHNIQUE (2d ed. 1977) (for further explanation of the test). See
also MATTE, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF THE POLYGRAPH TECHNIQUE (1980). See gen-
erally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 206, at 626-27.
Many early post-Frye courts treated Frye as if it established that polygraph results were
inadmissible regardless of any improvements in the technology. See People v. Davis, 343
Mich. 348, 371, 72 N.W.2d 269, 282 (1955) (noting that the polygraph had not quite
reached the dignity of positive evidence); People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 517, 307
N.Y.S.2d 430, 434, 255 N.E.2d 696, 700 (1969) (reliability of polygraph not adequately
established). Despite the increased use of polygraph tests in business and government,
more recent cases have declined to admit polygraph results. See Pulakis v. State, 476
P.2d 474, 479-80 (Alaska 1970) (polygraph results generally inadmissible, but can-be
waived); Marsh v. Lake Forest Hosp., 166 Ill. App. 3d 70, 77, 519 N.E.2d 504, 509 (2d
Dist. 1988) (polygraph results are discoverable, even though inadmissible at trial); People
v. Baynes, 88 II. 2d 225, 238-39, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1076-77 (1981) (polygraph test results
inadmissible despite stipulation by parties); State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 586-87 (Iowa
1980) (polygraph test results admissible by stipulation only); cf United States v. Oliver,
525 F.2d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976) ("[w]e cannot con-
clude that the stipulated or consented to polygraph is so unreliable as to be inadmissible
in this particular case.")
23. A "voiceprint" attempts to identify persons by their speech patterns. The test is
based on the theory that individuals have distinct but largely stable voice patterns. Sound
waves are recorded onto a graphic display, known as a spectrogram, that produces a
verbal "picture" of the suspect. Courts are markedly split on the admissibility of this
technique. See generally A. MOENSSENS AND F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES §§ 12.01-12.08 (2d ed. 1978); Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of
Voiceprint Evidence, 97 A.L.R. 3d 294 (1980); Note, supra note 19, at 327. Most courts
applying Frye, however, have held this controversial identification test inadmissible.
Compare United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v. Kelly,
17 Cal. 3d 24, 29-36, 549 P.2d 1240, 1247-48, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 151-52 (1976); People
v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 461, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 490 (1968); Reed v. State, 283 Md.
374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978) (all holding test inadmissible) with United States v.
Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.
1975); United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Baller, 519
F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671
(1975); State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 2d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983) (all holding test admis-
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sons,25 DNA identification tests,26 and numerous other forensic
techniques.27 In fact, until the 1970s, Frye remained relatively un-
criticized. Since then, the explosion of scientific advancement in
a wide variety of fields has resulted in the increased use of newly
developed scientific evidence at trial. 29 This increase highlights
sible). Illinois has yet to address directly this technique's admissibility. People v. Ash-
ford, 121 Ill. 2d 55, 78, 520 N.E.2d 332, 341 (1988).
24. Residue tests, such as neutron-activation analysis, atomic absorption analysis,
and trace metal detection tests, are used to determine, among other things, whether a
person fired a gun. Neutron-activation analysis is used to identify the source from which
a sample of material is taken. The object to be analyzed is made radioactive and the
amount of each chemical element present in the sample is then measured. For further
discussion of neutron-activation analysis see United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 436,
438, 441 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (test results admissible to
establish bomb fragments as having come from a particular manufacturer); People v.
Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 499 N.E.2d 1377 (1986) (admissible to connect bullets to the
cartridges from which they came); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Mo. 1972) (inad-
missible for comparing blood stains); Commonwealth v. Sero, 478 Pa. 440, 449-50, 387
A.2d 63, 68 (1978) (admissible to detect gunshot residue). See also Annotation, Admissi-
bility and Weight, in Criminal Case, of Expert Scientific Evidence Respecting Characteris-
tics and Identification of Human Hair, 23 A.L.R. 4th 1199 (1983); Annotation,
Admissibility of Evidence of Neutron Activation Analysis, 50 A.L.R. 3d 117 (1973).
Atomic absorption analysis is used to determine the type and quantity present in a
given sample. The technique involves vaporizing a given sample, such as gunshot resi-
due, into a light path. Once in the light path, the chemical composition of the sample
may be determined. For cases determining the admissibility of atomic absorption analy-
sis see Chatom v. State, 348 So. 2d 838, 842 (Ala. 1977); State v. Chatman, 156 N.J.
Super. 35, 38-40, 383 A.2d 440, 441-42 (App. Div. 1978); State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314,
326-28, 255 S.E.2d 373, 380-82 (1979); State v. McCall, 698 S.W.2d 643, 651 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1985).
Trace metal detection tests (TMDT) that reveal the existence of metal particles on a
subject's hands are often used to determine whether the subject recently fired a gun. The
metal particles become visible under ultraviolet light after the hands are sprayed with a
commercially prepared chemical solution. For a discussion on the admissibility of
TMDT see Reid v. State, 267 Ind. 555, 558-60, 372 N.E.2d 1149, 1151-52 (1978); State v.
Snyder, 190 N.J. Super. 626, 631-33, 464 A.2d 1209, 1211-12 (Law Div. 1983); State v.
Daniels, 37 Ohio App. 2d 4, 5-6, 305 N.E.2d 497, 498 (1973); Brotherton v. State, 666
S.W.2d 126, 129-30 (14th Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
25. A bite mark can be used as a form of identification because every individual has a
relatively unique dentition. People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 623, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61,
68-69 (1978); People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 394-98, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1356-60
(2d Dist. 1976) (citing and distinguishing Frye). See Annotation, Admissibility of Evi-
dence Tending to Identify Accused by His Own Bite Marks, 77 A.L.R. 3d 1122 (1977).
Determining the relevant scientific field has been something of a problem in bite mark
analysis cases. Compare Slone (citing "medical profession" as relevant field) with Milone
(citing "dentistry" as the relevant field). Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1209 n.74. See infra
notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discussing Milone). See generally infra notes 47-55
and accompanying text (differing definitions of relevant scientific community).
26. See infra notes 135-53 and accompanying text.
27. See Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1206 n.54.
28. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 883-85.
29. See W. BROAD AND N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 53 (1983); Giannelli,
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both the benefits and drawbacks of the Frye analysis. 30
The foremost criticism of the Frye test is that its "general accept-
ance" requirement negates valid scientific techniques and prevents
the admission of relevant evidence.31 Critics argue that because
"general acceptance" of a new scientific technique takes time, the
courts always will trail modem science.32 Thus, Frye is perceived
by many to inhibit, rather than enhance, the search for truth.33
Acknowledging that the "general acceptance" requirement
sometimes may preclude the admission of valid, reliable scientific
evidence, the proponents of Frye still perceive its conservative ap-
proach as a victory in caution.34 Such a strict standard often is
necessary, they argue, to prevent the admission of unreliable scien-
tific evidence 5.3  The proponents of the general acceptance theory
of Frye would prefer to reject five valid techniques in order to en-
supra note 11, at 1198-1200; Imwinkelried, supra note 2,at 555; Jasanoff, Science and The
Courts Advice For A Troubled Marriage, 2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (1986).
30. See infra notes 31-45 and accompanying text. See generally C. McCoRMICK,
supra note 8, § 203, at 606; Lipton, The Results of Scientific Techniques as Evidence in
Federal Courts: Evolution of the Frye v. United States Standard in the Period 1969-1977,
8 ENvTL. L. 769 (1978).
31. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1223-24.
32. See United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (citing C. MC-
CORMICK, supra note 8, § 203, at 491) (general acceptance is an impractical way of using
scientific advances); Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968),
appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970) ("Society
need not tolerate homicide until there develops a body of medical literature about some
particular lethal agent"). See generally Maletskos & Spielman, Introduction of New Sci-
entific Methods in Court, in LAW ENFORCEMENT SCI. AND TECH., 957, 958 (S.A. Yefsky
ed. 1967) (referring to the time period between reliability and general acceptance as a
"cultural lag"); Brown, DNA and Kelly-Frye: Who Will Survive In California?, 11 CRiM.
1, 27-29 (1988).
33. Lacey, supra note 19, at 265.
34. See Bretz, Scientific Evidence and The Frye Rule: The Case For a Cautious Ap-
proach, 4 COOLEY L. Rnv. 506, 513-14 (1987).
35. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (the conserva-
tive nature of Frye does not exact an unwarranted cost); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,
31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976) ("The primary advantage ... of
the Frye test lies in its essentially conservative nature. For a variety of reasons, Frye was
deliberately intended to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of
evidence based upon new scientific principles.... Several reasons founded in logic and
common sense support a posture of judicial caution in this area"); Reed v. State, 283 Md.
374, 384-85, 391 A.2d 364, 369 (1978) (although Frye may unduly prevent the admission
of relevant scientific evidence, there are "compelling reasons" that justify the principle).
See generally Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1223-24. But see Jonakait, Will Blood Tell?
Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMORY L.J. 833, 845 (1982) ("Both proponents
and detractors of Frye agree that a stringent legal standard assures that a scientific test is
reliable before it is admitted .... however, the Frye standard is insufficient to assure
reliability in the case of genetic marker tests. Whether these forensic procedures are
reliable or not, Frye admits them.")
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sure that not one invalid technique is admitted.36 Those in favor of
Frye also argue that general acceptance assures the availability of
experts within the particular scientific field who can critically ex-
amine the validity and reliability of the scientific evidence. 3 These
commentators further note that, under the Frye test, an initial rul-
ing on the admissibility of evidence related to a particular tech-
nique will serve as precedent for subsequent trials; therefore, they
claim that the Frye approach fosters judicial economy3" and en-
hances judicial uniformity.39
In response to these contentions, the opponents of Frye assert
that the test is too amorphous to provide an orderly and uniform
method of evaluating scientific evidence. They point out that the
Frye test fails to specify what "thing" must be generally accepted,
who must accept it, or what constitutes general acceptance. 40 The
36. For example, if the Nobel prize winner in a specific field conducts a thoroughly
dispositive experiment to validate a new scientific technique, the courts cannot admit the
evidence until most of the scientists in that specialized field know and approve of the
theory. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 557. See also Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and
Tactics for the Proponents of Scientific Evidence, in Sci. AND EXPERT EvID. 33, 43 (2d ed.
1981).
37. Brown, supra note 32, at 29. Proponents of Frye argue that assuring a "minimum
reserve of experts" is for the benefit of both parties. Concerned that juries tend to give
too much weight to scientific evidence, the proponents argue that a general acceptance
standard will provide sufficient numbers of scientists in opposition to the evidence, thus
ensuring the evidence that is admitted will be deserving of the considerable weight one
would expect juries to give it. Addison, 498 F.2d at 744. See also Giannelli, supra note
11, at 1207-08 n.65. Opponents of Frye state that a less stringent standard could easily
overcome its deficiencies by requiring "that the opposing party be provided with the op-
portunity to secure the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, thus guaranteeing a re-
serve of experts who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a
particular case." Id. See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 203, at 608-09.
38. Brown, supra note 32, at 32. Under the Frye rule, once a novel technique is
deemed admissible as evidence, it will receive judicial recognition that obviates future
litigation on the matter. Id. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 32, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
149, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1976) ("once a trial court has admitted evidence based upon a
new scientific technique, and that decision is affirmed on appeal by a published appellate
decision, the precedent so established may control subsequent trials, at least until new
evidence is presented reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific community.")
Opponents of Frye contend that such precedent would not obviate the long established
practice of pre-trial evidentiary hearings. Brown, supra note 32, at 32 (citing C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 8, § 205). Cf Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1218 n.154 (judicial opinions
from outside jurisdictions are merely persuasive and therefore do not necessarily stream-
line judicial consideration of the issue.)
39. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 31, 549 P.2d at 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49. Frye
advocates argue that the general acceptance test enhances judicial uniformity because
judges who may differ in their interpretation of reliability may be guided by consistent
agreement in the scientific community. Id. See also Comment, The Voiceprint Dilemma:
Should Voices Be Seen and Not Heard?, 35 MD. L. REv. 267, 290 (1975). See generally
Brown, supra note 32, at 31.
40. Note, Novel Scientific Evidence: Does Frye Require That General Acceptance
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term general acceptance alone has been criticized for being "re-
markably vague," '4 1 "undefinable,' 42 and "based on an erroneous
assumption. ' 43 Even the initial determination of whether the evi-
dence in question is "scientific evidence," and therefore subject to
the Frye test, has caused difficulties.' Critics of Frye claim that
this lack of concreteness has resulted in selective application of the
test and conflicting decisions.45
III. APPLICATION OF FRYE IN JURISDICTIONS OTHER THAN
ILLINOIS
Whichever side of the debate one happens to favor, the ambigu-
ous nature of the Frye test has undisputedly led to multiple varia-
tions and abstractions. The Frye standard basically involves a two-
step analysis: 1) identification of the scientific field in which the
evidence belongs, and 2) determination of whether the evidence has
been generally accepted by members of that field.4 Depending
upon how narrowly or broadly they construe these two steps,
courts utilizing Frye run the gamut from strict application to out-
right rejection.
A. The Scientific Field
The identification of the relevant scientific community47 from
which to measure general acceptance often determines whether ev-
Within The Scientific Community Be Established By Disinterested Scientists?, 65 U. DET.
L. REv. 147, 154 (1987).
41. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVI-
DENCE § 5168, at 87 (1978). See Brown, supra note 32, at 32.
42. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL.
L.F. 1, 14 (1970) ("The Frye standard... tends to obscure these proper considerations by
asserting an undefinable general acceptance as the principle if not the sole determinative
factor.")
43. Moenssens, supra, note 1, at 562 ("insistence on general acceptance is based on
the erroneous assumption 'that the scientific community speaks with a single voice on the
acceptance of novel scientific procedures'.") (quoting Symposium on Science and the
Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 221 (1983)). See generally Brown, supra note 32, at 32.
44. See, e.g., infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
45. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 904 ("[t]he courts that have moved away from
Frye have obviously done so because of a perception that the standard is too rigid, some-
what unclear, and an unnecessary and undesirable barrier to the admissibility of scientific
evidence in some situations."); Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 595, 601 n.23 (1988). See also infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
46. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1208.
47. The ambiguity inherent in the term "relevant scientific community" has resulted
in an array of interpretations. See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d
671, 677-78, 682 (1975). See also supra note 25 for discussion of two differing views on
the "relevant scientific field" in bite mark analysis cases.
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idence will be admitted. If the relevant scientific field requirement
is construed broadly, the Frye test acts as a formidable barrier to
admissibility. In Cornett v. State,48 for example, the relevant scien-
tific community for purposes of spectrograph (voiceprint) analysis
was held to include engineers, linguists, and psychologists, as well
as those who use voice spectrography for identification purposes.4 9
Because different disciplines do not share a common view of a par-
ticular scientific method, the burden of establishing general accept-
ance is undoubtedly onerous. Consequently, the broader the
construction of the relevant scientific field, the less likely the party
will be able to utilize the novel scientific evidence. 50
At the opposite end of the spectrum, some courts choose to iden-
tify the relevant scientific field with more particularity, resulting in
a liberal application of the Frye standard. In People v. Williams,51
for example, a test used to detect narcotics use was subjected to the
Frye analysis.5 2 Although the general medical profession was unfa-
miliar with the test, the court required general acceptance only
among those expected to be familiar with its use.5 3 By defining the
scientific field in such a limited manner, courts can greatly enhance
the possibility that scientific evidence will be admitted under the
Frye standard.
The practice of using a narrow relevant field, however, can lead
to a substantial departure from the Frye test because general ac-
ceptance may become, in reality, the opinion of a few experts.54
48. 450 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 1983)..
49. Id. at 503 (citing People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 708, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368
(1978)). See also People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 456, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 490
(1968) ("Communication by speech does not fall within any one established category of
science. Its understanding requires a knowledge of anatomy, physiology, physics, psy-
chology and linguistics.")
50. The voice spectrograph evidence was held inadmissible in Cornett for not having
gained general acceptance in the scientific community as it was liberally defined. Cornett,
450 N.E.2d at 503. The D.C. Circuit applies Frye more conservatively by requiring gen-
eral acceptance in the entire scientific community "as a whole." United States v. Addi-
son, 498 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also infra text accompanying note 57
("substantial section of the scientific community needed").
51. 331 P.2d 251 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1958).
52. Id. at 253. The technique, known as the Nalline Test, detects recent narcotics use
by measuring the dilation of a subject's pupils subsequent to an injection of Nalline (N-
allylnormorphine). Pupil dilation indicates the recent use of narcotics. Id. at 252-53.
53. Id. at 254. Accord Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677
(1975) ("The requirement of the Frye rule of general acceptability is satisfied, in our
opinion, if the principle is generally accepted by those who would be expected to be
familiar with its use.")
54. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1209-10. See also Cornett, 450 N.E.2d at 503 ("It is
natural, of course, that the people actively employing the new scientific process are urging
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Severely limiting the breadth of a scientific field could eliminate
many acknowledged experts who oppose the technique. Allowing
a court to ignore the opinions of scientists standing in opposition to
the questioned process undermines the Frye test because contrary
opinions held by qualified scientists may indicate a lack of general
acceptance.
55
B. General Acceptance
Once the breadth of the scientific field has been determined, the
court must decide whether the scientific technique has been gener-
ally accepted by that group.5 6 As with the breadth of the scientific
field, differing judicial interpretations of "general acceptance" have
led to inconsistent applications of the Frye standard. Some courts
have adopted a conservative approach, requiring acceptance by a
"substantial section of the scientific community"" or by declaring
that general acceptance may not be established without the testi-
mony of disinterested scientists.58 Other courts have taken a less
extreme view, defining general acceptance as "common to many,
or the greatest number; widespread; prevalent; extensive though
its introduction into evidence. However... it appears that only a small group of the
same people testify again and again in order to get this evidence admitted.")
55. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978) (voice spectro-
graph inadmissible for failing to establish general acceptance). There is some indication
that judicial ignorance of scientific opposition to the technique may be quite prevalent in
criminal trials because usually only the prosecution produces expert testimony to support
the scientific evidence. The trial judge generally assesses the acceptability of the tech-
nique on this one witness' testimony, who is not likely to identify uncertainties or inade-
quacies that may surround the technique. Moenssens, supra note 1, at 557. At least one
reason for this is the potentially significant expense of obtaining expert testimony and the
economic advantage the state possesses over many defendants. A Deputy District Attor-
ney in San Diego estimated that one expert witness earned over $100,000 for his testi-
mony regarding electrophoretic multi-system testing of bloodstains. Brown, supra note
32, at 30 n.204.
56. See generally Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1211 ("Most courts applying Frye have
not addressed the (general acceptance] issue adequately; they have either ignored it alto-
gether or offered rather general statements.")
57. United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d
1194 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); see also Giannelli, supra note 11,
at 1211 n.95.
58. See People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977). A divided Michi-
gan Supreme Court affirmed Barbara in People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 391 N.W.2d
270 (1986), relying on the Frye standard as well as its own self-imposed demand for
experts whose livelihood is not "intimately connected with the new technique." Young,
425 Mich. at 483, 391 N.W.2d at 276 (citing Barbara, 400 Mich. at 376, 255 N.W.2d at
180). Illinois has rejected this approach. See People v. Eyler, 133 InI. 2d 173, 215-16, 549
N.E.2d 268, 287 (1989). This approach is probably better termed as a departure from
Frye, rather than a conservative application of it, because Frye never contemplated ac-
ceptance by disinterested scientists.
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not universal." 59 Still other courts have found general acceptance
to be synonymous with reliability.eo This very liberal interpreta-
tion essentially abandons the Frye standard because the reliability
of a scientific technique could be established notwithstanding its
lack of general acceptance in the scientific community.6' Similarly,
other courts have determined that general acceptance goes to the
evidence's weight rather than its admissibility. 62 Approaching sci-
entific evidence in this manner eviscerates the Frye standard be-
cause general acceptance becomes merely one factor, rather than
the preeminent criterion, to be considered when determining the
admissibility of the scientific evidence. Finally, a few jurisdictions
have expressly rejected the Frye test, leaving the determination of
admissibility within the normal doctrine of relevancy or some
other standard.63
59. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir.1972) (citing Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St. 75, 63 N.E. 594 (1902)); Giannelli,
supra note 11, at 1211. See also United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438, 441 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1970) (finding admissibility despite testimony that the test was
too unreliable or not sufficiently conclusive); Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70-71
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
927 (1970) (trial judge did not abuse discretion in finding the scientific evidence reliable
and generally accepted despite testimony to the contrary); State v. Washington, 229 Kan.
47, 55, 622 P.2d 986, 993 (1981) (holding the test "sufficiently accepted as reliable"). See
generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 203, at 606.
60. See United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
827 (1981); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). In the Sixth Circuit, the
court indicated that general acceptance was synonymous with reliability. United States
v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975) (admissibility of voiceprint evidence). Such a
statement clearly represents an abandonment of Frye. This trend became more evident
when the Sixth Circuit did not even mention the Frye analysis in United States v. Jenkins,
525 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1975) (evidence based upon ion microprobic analysis was inadmis-
sible). The Sixth Circuit returned to the Frye analysis in United States v. Brown, 557
F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977), however, it did so without offering any underlying rationale.
Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1220.
61. It is also possible that scientific evidence could be generally accepted but never-
theless unreliable. Consider, for example, the "paraffin test" that was designed to detect
gunshot residue on a person's hand. The court adopted and used it widely for at least
twenty years until a comprehensive evaluation of the technique deemed it unreliable. Gi-
annelli, supra note 11, at 1224-25. See Jonakait, supra note 35, at 854-57.
62. See State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 119, 267 P.2d 893, 894 (1954); People v. Marx,
54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 110, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1975); Jenkins v. State, 156 Ga. App.
387, 388-89, 274 S.E.2d 618, 619-20 (1980); People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 197, 499
N.E.2d 1355, 1367 (1986). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 203, at 606.
63. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3rd Cir. 1985) (Frye is "too
malleable to provide the method for orderly and uniform decision-making envisioned by
some of its proponents."); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978)
(evaluating voiceprint evidence based on "the probativeness, materiality and reliability of
the evidence, on one side, and any tendency to mislead, prejudice or confuse the jury on
the other.. ."); State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 981 (La. 1979) (rejected Frye and held
polygraph evidence inadmissible because its probative value was outweighed by reasons
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IV. FRYE IN ILLINOIS: ACCEPTANCE OR GENERAL
RELIABILITY?
The earliest case of record to consider the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence in Illinois was People v. Jennings,M a 1911 case that
predates Frye. Being the first court in the United States to address
the admissibility of fingerprint evidence, the Jennings court con-
cluded that the technique was admissible because of its reliability65
and its common usage among law enforcement officials.66 By re-
quiring both reliability and acceptance, Jennings foreshadowed the
now more popular Frye analysis. Both cases link the reliability of
scientific evidence to the general acceptance of such evidence
within a relevant scientific community.67
Illinois' adoption of the Frye standard has been enigmatic. It
was not until 198 1,68 in People v. Baynes,69 that Illinois purportedly
adopted the Frye test. In Baynes, the trial court admitted evidence
resulting from a polygraph test pursuant to a stipulation between
for its exclusion); Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co., 202 Mont. 185, 193, 657 P.2d 594,
598 (1983) (general acceptance rule does not conform to the spirit of the federal rules of
evidence); State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 58, 446 N.E.2d 444, 447-48 (1983) ("scien-
tific nose-counting" not required). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 203, at
607.
64. 252 Ill. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911). The standards set forth under Jennings regard-
ing the admissibility of scientific evidence were not materially based upon any previous
Illinois court decisions.
65. Id. at 546-47, 96 N.E. at 1081. The court stated that "standard authorities on
scientific subjects discuss the use of fingerprints as a system of identification, concluding
that experience has shown it to be reliable." Id.
66. Id at 549, 96 N.E. at 1082. The court explained "that this method of identifica-
tion is in such general and common use that the courts cannot refuse to take judicial
cognizance of it." Id
67. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See supra notes 15-20
and accompanying text.
68. In Illinois, historical data and case law pertaining to the admissibility of scientific
evidence prior to the 1970s is relatively sparse. During this period, courts did not treat
scientific evidence as a general category. Discussion of standards for admitting a tech-
nique were generally confined, i.e., application to other contexts was not addressed. See
People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302, 306, 189 N.E.2d 260, 263 (1963) (polygraph); People v.
White, 365 Ill. 499, 6 N.E.2d 1015 (1937) (handwriting comparison); People v. Fisher,
340 Ill. 216, 172 N.E. 743 (1930) (expert testimony connecting bullet to gun from which
it was fired); People v. Pfanschmidt, 252 Ill. 534, 404 N.E. 804 (1914) (results of blood-
hound search not reliable and thus inadmissible); Carleton v. People, 251111. 431, 96 N.E.
268 (1894) (footprint evidence); Watt v. People, 126 Ill. 9, 18 N.E. 340 (1888) (expert
testimony regarding similarity of hair samples); People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99
N.E.2d 567 (1951) (intoxication test admissible). See generally Recent Illinois Decisions,
31 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 188 (1952). An in-depth analysis of the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence prior to the 1970s is beyond the scope of this Comment.
69. 88 Ill. 2d 225, 430 N.E.2d 1070 (1981).
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the defendant and the prosecution.7 0 The Illinois Supreme Court
reversed, holding the polygraph results inadmissible despite the
stipulation because of the test's disputed scientific reliability. 7 The
court stated that mutual agreement on the admission of scientific
evidence does not make unreliable scientific evidence reliable.' 2
Although subsequent cases have referred to Baynes as adopting
the Frye standard,'3 a careful reading of the case indicates that this
is not so. Baynes only cited Frye with approval and never explicitly
extended Frye's application to scientific evidence beyond the poly-
graph test.74 Nor did the court inquire whether the polygraph was
generally accepted in the scientific community; rather, it merely
concluded that the test was not reliable. 7  Reliability and general
acceptance are not interchangeable constructs.' 6 Moreover,
Baynes was not the first Illinois court to consider the admissibility
of polygraph evidence. Previous cases disallowed polygraph evi-
dence, not because of its lack of general acceptance, but because it
was not scientifically reliable." The Baynes court used the same
70. Id. at 230, 430 N.E.2d at 1072. The test was also admitted without objection. Id.
The defendant was arrested for burglarizing an unoccupied pickup truck. Id. at 229, 430
N.E.2d at 1072. He agreed to take a polygraph test and, in the opinion of the examiner,
lied in response to certain relevant questions. Id. at 230, 430 N.E.2d at 1072. A jury
found the defendant guilty of one count of burglary of a tachometer. Id. He was sen-
tenced to five years imprisonment. Id.
71. Id. at 245, 430 N.E.2d at 1079. The court opined, "[i]f the instrument is accurate
and the recording of the instrument's results reliable, then we should conclude it is ac-
ceptable. But the process has not reached a level of sophistication that makes it generally
more probative than prejudicial." Id. at 239, 430 N.E.2d at 1077.
72. Id. at 239-40, 430 N.E.2d at 1077. The court stated "[b]y what logic should
stipulated polygraph evidence be admitted if the same evidence, absent a stipulation, is
barred?... If evidence is unreliable, agreeing to its admission does not make it reliable."
Id. See also Marsh v. Lake Forest Hosp., 166 Ill. App. 3d 70, 519 N.E.2d 504 (2d Dist.
1988) (polygraph results are discoverable even though they are inadmissible at trial).
73. See, e.g., People v. Eyler, 133 111. 2d 173, 211, 549 N.E.2d 268, 285 (1989) ("We
have accepted the Frye standard for evaluating the admissibility of new scientific tech-
niques."); People v. Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9, 526 N.E.2d 525, 530 (2d Dist. 1988)
("Illinois follows the test set forth in Frye v. United States ... ")
74. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 234-35, 241, 430 N.E.2d at 1074, 1077. The court cited Frye
mainly as evidence of an early case that described and rejected the technique. Id.
75. Id. at 244, 430 N.E.2d at 1079 ("Polygraph evidence is not reliable enough to be
admitted.") In fact, the court does not even mention general acceptance (except for its
quote of Frye).
76. See supra note 61 and accompanying text for a reference to scientific evidence
that is generally accepted although unreliable.
77. See Illinois Polygraph Soc'y v. Pellicano, 83 Ill. 2d 130, 139, 414 N.E.2d 458, 463
(1980) ("There is still enough doubt about the reliability of detection-of-deception instru-
ments, and the varying expertise of those who use them, to justify the General Assembly's
decision to set minimum standards which prefer one instrument over another"); People v.
Zazzetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302, 309, 189 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1963) ("[t]he scientific reliability of
the polygraph has long been the subject of dispute among learned experts"); People v.
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reasoning as these earlier cases, and gave no hint that Illinois
would adopt a new general acceptance standard of admissibility.78
Nevertheless, it is universally accepted that Baynes adopted the
Frye standard.79
The purported adoptions' of Frye in Baynes and other subse-
quent lie detector test cases did not lead to its immediate applica-
tion in other contexts. In People v. Gibson,"' for example, the
defendant argued that the testimony of a witness who was hypno-
tized prior to trial, in an attempt to refresh her recollection, was
admitted in error.8 2 The witness, who tentatively identified the de-
Monigan, 72 Ill. App. 3d 87, 95, 390 N.E.2d 562, 567 (5th Dist. 1979) ("We refuse to
sustain such an evidentiary stipulation because it has not been demonstrated that the
technique and processes used in a polygraph examination are scientifically reliable"); Peo-
ple v. Potts, 74 Ill. App. 2d 301, 306, 220 N.E.2d 251, 253 (5th Dist. 1966) ('The scien-
tific reliability of the polygraph has long been the subject of dispute among learned
experts."))
78. The court also noted that the Illinois General Assembly cast doubt on the tech-
nique's reliability by enacting a statute forbidding its use in criminal trials. Baynes, 88 Ill.
2d at 237, 430 N.E.2d at 1076 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 155-11 (1977)).
79. Perhaps the reason for the confusion is that both Baynes and Frye involved lie
detector tests, and in both cases the evidence was found inadmissible. Moreover, the
difference between general acceptance and reliability is subtle. General acceptance en-
sures reliability; reliability can exist irrespective of general acceptance. But see supra note
61 (example of when unreliable evidence is generally accepted).
80. Because subsequent cases refer to Baynes as adopting the Frye standard, this
Comment accepts that position for simplicity purposes. Furthermore, because subse-
quent cases have explicitly adopted Frye, the question is, as a practical matter, moot. See,
e.g., People v. Zayas, 131 II. 2d 284, 546 N.E.2d 513 (1989).
81. 117 Ill. App. 3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368 (4th Dist. 1983).
82. Gibson, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 272, 452 N.E.2d at 1371. See generally Alderman &
Barrette, Hypnosis on Trial: A Practical Perspective on the Application of Forensic Hypno-
sis in Criminal Cases, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1982); Diamond, Inherent Problems in the
Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 313 (1980); Mick-
enberg, Mesmerizing Justice: The Use of Hypnotically-Induced Testimony in Criminal
Trials, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 927 (1983); Orne, The Use & Misuse of Hypnosis in Court,
27 INT'L J. OF CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 312 (1979); Ruffra, Hypnotically
Induced Testimony: Should It Be Admitted, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 293 (1983); Recent De-
velopment, Growing Disenchantment with Hypnotic Means of Refreshing Recall, 41
VAND. L. REv. 379 (1988). In Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), the Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of an Arkansas rule of evidence barring admission of an
accused's hypnotically refreshed testimony. The Court held that the rule violated the
defendant's constitutional right to testify. Id. The dissent argued that "a rule designed to
exclude testimony whose trustworthiness is inherently suspect" was not an unreasonable
restriction on a defendant's right to testify. Id. at 64 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The
Rock decision may cast a shadow on the future of Frye. One commentator noted that:
[a]lthough the court in Rock expressly limited its holding to cases involving the
testimony of a defendant, to the extent that a defendant's right to testify is based
upon her sixth amendment right to call witnesses in her favor, the Court's pro-
hibition ... logically applies to the testimony in general of defense witnesses.
Consequently, Rock casts doubt upon the constitutionality of the Frye rule as
applied to defense experts.
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fendant previously, made a positive identification following a hyp-
notic session.13
In determining the admissibility of the testimony, the court con-
sidered the defendant's contention that hypnotism presented the
same problem of admissibility as lie detector tests or other scien-
tific tests.84 Thus, the defendant argued, its admissibility would
require proof that the technique was generally accepted in the sci-
entific community that developed it. The court explicitly rejected
this approach, reasoning that Frye is concerned with the admissi-
bility of the results from a scientific technique and not the admissi-
bility of eyewitness testimony. 5  In the court's opinion,
hypnotically induced testimony was not "scientific evidence" sub-
ject to the Frye standard. Therefore, the court admitted the testi-
mony after the hypnotic session without a showing of the general
acceptance of hypnosis.8 6
In People v. Zayas,8 7 the Illinois Supreme Court tacitly over-
turned Gibson and cases adopting its rationale. The court applied a
Frye analysis88 to hypnotically induced testimony 9 and concluded
that because hypnotically induced recall is not generally accepted
as accurate, it is not admissible.9' The court cited with approval
other jurisdictions that "properly applie[d]" the standard set forth
Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 119, 125 (1987).
83. 117 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 452 N.E.2d at 1371.
84. Id. at 275, 452 N.E.2d at 1372.
85. Id. at 276, 452 N.E.2d at 1373. Additionally, the court opined that a procedure's
reliability in a given situation is more important than its theoretical general reliability.
Id.
86. In People v. Cohoon, 120 Ill. App. 3d 62, 457 N.E.2d 998 (5th Dist. 1983), the
court reaffirmed Gibson, admitting into evidence a victim's identification of the defendant
even though the victim had been hypnotized by a police officer who had only thirty hours
of training in hypnosis. Id. at 65, 457 N.E.2d at 1000-02.
87. 131 Ill. 2d 284, 546 N.E.2d 513 (1989). See also People v. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29,
42-49, 506 N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (1987) (outlining the law in other jurisdictions).
88. The court blithely equated the Frye test with Baynes. Zayas at 293, 546 N.E.2d at
517. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text (discussing Baynes in relation to
Frye), infra notes 185-95 and accompanying text (discussing problems caused by uncer-
tainty as to whether Illinois requires scientific evidence to be reliable or generally
accepted).
89. Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d at 293-96, 546 N.E.2d at 517-18.
90. Id. at 294-95, 546 N.E.2d at 518. Rejecting the notion that this type of testimony
is accurate, the court stated that:
[t]he relevant scientific community does not generally accept that hypnotically
induced recall is accurate .... As such, we find that because its reliability is
suspect, and it is not amenable to verification due to the fact that even the
experts cannot agree upon its effectiveness as a memory-restorative device, a
witness' hypnotically induced testimony, other than that of the defendant, is not
admissible in Illinois courts.
1990]
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in Frye9 and held that this standard would be applied to hypnotic
testimony in Illinois.92
Hypnotically induced testimony is not the only type of evidence
to which the Illinois courts have been unwilling to apply the Frye
standard. The courts also have been unwilling to apply Frye to
visual evidence. Contemporaneous with the Gibson decision, the
first district considered the admissibility of a handprint for identifi-
cation purposes.93 In People v. Columbo, the defendant argued that
scientific evidence in the form of handprint measurements lacked
general acceptance in the scientific community.94 Specifically, the
only expert rendering an opinion on the handprint conceded that
he never performed such an analysis previously, never heard of
such an identification being done by anyone else, and never read
anything about the technique in a professional journal.95 Never-
theless, the court concluded that the evidence was admissible on
the grounds that Frye applied only to evidence derived from the
interpretation of mechanical data and not from mere visual com-
parison.96 The court reasoned that evidence involving such a vis-
ual comparison does not carry the same dangers of prejudicing and
overwhelming the jury as evidence involving mechanical
equipment.97
The Columbo court relied predominantly on People v. Milone,9
a case involving bite mark analysis. In Milone, the State intro-
duced evidence that matched a bite mark on the deceased to the
91. Id. at 293, 516 N.E.2d at 517.
92. Id. at 294, 516 N.E.2d at 518.
93. 118 Ill. App. 3d 882, 455 N.E.2d 733 (Ist Dist. 1983). Defendant Patricia
Columbo was found guilty of the murders of her mother, father, and brother. Id. at 886,
455 N.E.2d at 740.
94. Id. at 957, 455 N.E.2d at 788. The handprint analysis involved ostensibly more
than just measurements; the expert used his knowledge of the human skeleton to con-
clude that the handprint made on the trunk of a car was missing an index finger, and that
it "could not have been made by someone holding his index finger up off the surface
because the underlying bone in the palm of the hand was present on the surface of the
car." Id. at 957, 455 N.E.2d at 787.
95. Id. at 961, 455 N.E.2d at 790. The expert was a professor of physical anthropol-
ogy at the University of Illinois in Champaign-Urbana. Id. at 905, 455 N.E.2d at 752.
96. Id. at 960, 455 N.E.2d at 790. The Columbo court even went so far as to "con-
clude that expert testimony regarding the results of a scientific process in which there are
no intermediate mechanical stages is admissible once a competent expert testifies that the
scientific process in question is reliable." Id. (emphasis added). See infra notes 183-84 and
accompanying text (discussion of this statement's effect).
97. See Columbo, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 957-58, 455 N.E.2d at 789 ("It is our opinion
that the inherent unreliability of mechanical equipment renders these cases inapposite to
the case at bar.")
98. 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (2d Dist. 1976).
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defendant's dentition.99 The defendant argued that this evidence
was inadmissible because it failed to meet either the Frye general
acceptance or the Jennings reliability requirements. °° The court
rejected the defendant's argument and held that the evidence was
admissible. The court reasoned that expert testimony regarding
the visual comparison between the bite mark and the defendant's
dentition served only to lend assistance to the trial court in inter-
preting physical evidence; there was no "intermediate mechanical
stage" in which reliability could have been questioned.10 1 Thus,
Jennings and Frye did not apply. The Milone court glossed over
the similar visual comparison involved in Jennings.10 2
Perhaps the biggest problem with the appellate court's attempt
to limit Frye's application to scientific techniques involving only an
intermediate mechanical stage'0 3 is lack of uniformity. Blood spat-
ter analysis, ,o4 for example, is used to determine the direction from
which a person has been shot by observing the way blood splatters
on nearby objects.'10 Although this process involves only a visual
99. Id. at 392, 356 N.E.2d at 1355. The defendant was convicted for the appallingly
brutal beating and murder of a fourteen-year old girl and was sentenced to 90 to 175
years imprisonment. Id. at 386-87, 356 N.E.2d at 1351-52. In addition to much circum-
stantial evidence implicating the defendant, the State compiled over 1300 pages of dental
testimony correlating a bite mark on the victim's inner thigh and the defendant's denti-
tion. Id. at 392, 356 N.E.2d at 1355.
100. Id. at 394, 356 N.E.2d at 1356-57. The Milone decision predated Baynes. Also,
referring to Jennings as a "reliability" standard is an oversimplification. As discussed
supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text, it may very well be that Jennings required
general acceptance as well as reliability.
101. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 396, 356 N.E.2d at 1358.
102. Milone distinguished Jennings and Frye by claiming that bite mark evidence "is
more analogous to footprint, fingerprint, and hair comparisons .... Id.
103. As evidenced by Columbo and Milone.
104. In addition to blood spatter analysis, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) is
another area in which the appellate court has ignored its own determination that Frye
does not apply to scientific evidence involving only visual comparison. HGN is a field-
sobriety test in which a subject visually follows a pen or pencil held by a police officer as
it is moved horizontally back and forth in front of the subject. Basically, eye movement
that jerks or is not smooth indicates that the subject is not sober. In People v. Vega, 145
Ill. App. 3d 996, 1000, 496 N.E.2d 501, 504-05 (4th Dist. 1986), the court noted in dicta
that, although Frye was the appropriate standard of admissibility, it could not be applied
to the admissibility of HGN due to insufficient evidence in the record. Id. at 1001, 496
N.E.2d at 505. People v. Dakuras, 172 Ill. App. 3d 865, 868-70, 527 N.E.2d 163, 165-66
(2d Dist. 1988), likewise sidestepped an application of Frye by holding HGN inconsistent
with an Illinois statute limiting sobriety tests to a person's blood, urine, breath, or other
bodily substance. Id. at 869, 527 N.E.2d at 166 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para.
11-501.2 (1987)). See also People v. Furness, 172 Ill. App. 3d 845, 849, 526 N.E.2d 947,
949 (5th Dist. 1988) (although no cases have directly addressed the issue of HGN's gen-
eral acceptance in the scientific community, it is acceptable for establishing probable
cause for arrest). Id.
105. See generally A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 23.
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analysis, Illinois courts addressing the technique's admissibility
have applied either the Frye general acceptance or the Jennings re-
liability 06 standard, thereby ignoring the intermediate mechanical
stage theory Columbo and Milone developed. The only Illinois
case to allow blood-spatter evidence is People v. Knox.1° 7 Citing
the Frye general acceptance standard, °10 the Knox court concluded
that the trial court made an informed decision regarding the "relia-
bility" of the evidence and, in doing so, did not abuse its discre-
tion. 09 Three years later, the court in People v. Owens 110 held the
same blood spatter technique to be inadmissible on the grounds
that the State failed to establish the technique was based upon a
well-recognized scientific principle having general acceptance in
the relevant scientific field.II
Thus, two non-intermediate mechanical stage cases apply Frye
and ignore Columbo and Milone. One case admits the blood spat-
ter evidence because it meets the "reliability" aspect of Frye; I 2 the
second rejects the blood spatter evidence because it fails to meet
the "general acceptance" component of Frye.1 1 3 These cases illus-
trate that Frye is applied selectively and interpreted inconsistently.
People v. Ferguson 1 4 was the first case to recognize that some
decisions have applied Frye regardless of the type of scientific evi-
dence considered, while others have drawn a distinction between
evidence involving visual comparison and evidence containing an
intermediate mechanical stage. 1 5 Ferguson considered the admis-
sibility of expert testimony regarding shoe-wear patterns, the the-
ory being that identification may be made by comparing shoe-wear
patterns from different pairs of a person's shoes because wear pat-
terns are unique. 116
106. See supra note 100 (referring to Jennings only as a reliability standard is
inaccurate).
107. 121 Ill. App. 3d 579, 459 N.E.2d 1077 (3d Dist. 1984).
108. Actually, the court cited Baynes but interpreted that case to require general ac-
ceptance. See Knox, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 583, 459 N.E.2d at 1080.
109. Id. at 583, 584, 459 N.E.2d at 1080, 1081. See supra notes 60-61 and accompa-
nying text (it is inaccurate to equate Frye's general acceptance standard with a reliability
standard).
110. 155 Ill. App. 3d 990, 508 N.E.2d 1088 (4th Dist. 1987).
111. Id. at 998-99, 508 N.E.2d at 1094.
112. Knox, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 583, 584, 459 N.E.2d at 1080, 1081.
113. Owens, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 998-99, 508 N.E.2d at 1094-95.
114. 172 Ill. App. 3d 1, 526 N.E.2d 525 (2d Dist. 1988).
115. Id. at 10, 526 N.E.2d at 531-32.
116. Id. at 5-6, 526 N.E.2d at 528-29. This is not the same as shoe print identifica-
tion, which compares a shoe print with the shoe suspected of making that print. Gener-
ally, Illinois admits shoe print identifications. See Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 8, 526
N.E.2d at 530 (citing People v. Hanson, 31 111. 2d 31, 39-40, 198 N.E.2d 815, 819-20
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After explicitly stating that Illinois had adopted the Frye test,
the court held that shoe-wear identification had not gained general
acceptance in the scientific field. In reaching its conclusion that
the expert's testimony should be excluded,1"7 the Ferguson court
also reviewed the line of Illinois cases adopting a non-intermediate
mechanical stage exception to the Frye test." 8 The court noted
that these cases depend on the "reliability" standard created in
Jennings."9 Even the less stringent Jennings standard, however,
would not permit the evidence to be admitted. 20
Thus, courts applying Frye have utilized one of two theories.
Some courts have applied Frye to all scientific evidence; others
have applied it only to scientific evidence involving an intermediate
mechanical stage. This dichotomy continues to be a source of con-
fusion for Illinois courts.' 2' In People v. Sandy,'22 for example, a
doctor was permitted to testify about "tin ear syndrome," a new
(1964)); People v. Diaz, 169 Ill. App. 3d 66, 71, 522 N.E.2d 1386, 1390 (2d Dist. 1988);
People v. Henne, 165 Ill. App. 3d 315, 325, 518 N.E.2d 1276, 1282 (4th Dist. 1988);
People v. Ricketts, 109 Ill. App. 3d 992, 997-98, 441 N.E.2d 384, 387-88 (4th Dist. 1982);
People v. Gordon, 94 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766, 419 N.E.2d 66, 68-69 (3d Dist. 1981); People
v. Lomas, 92 Ill. App. 3d 957, 959-60, 416 N.E.2d 408, 411 (3d Dist. 1981); People v.
Robbins, 21 111. App. 3d 317, 321-23, 315 N.E.2d 198, 201-03 (3d Dist. 1974); People v.
Stanbeary, 126 Ill. App. 2d 244, 250, 261 N.E.2d 765, 768 (4th Dist. 1970). See generally
Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony that item of clothing or footgear belonged
to, or was worn by, particular individual, 71 A.L.R. 4th 1148 (1989). Cf Annotation,
Admissibility of Bare Footprint Evidence, 45 A.L.R. 4th 1178 (1986) (analyzing cases
outside of Illinois discussing the admissibility of bare footprint evidence).
117. Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 9, 526 N.E.2d at 531. The expert was unaware of
any studies done on the subject other than her own. According to the expert's own testi-
mony, she was the only individual in the anthropological community who believed that a
person could be identified by their shoe wear pattern. Id.
118. Id. at 10-11, 526 N.E.2d at 532.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 11, 526 N.E.2d at 532.
121. In some instances, the Frye standard is ignored even though an intermediate
mechanical stage is clearly present. In People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 499 N.E.2d
1355 (1986), for example, the court held admissible evidence derived from neutron-acti-
vation analysis because of its reliability and its acceptance by a majority of other jurisdic-
tions. Id. at 197, 499 N.E.2d at 1367 ("neutron activation analysis has come to be
accepted as a consistently reliable forensic-science technique, with a majority of jurisdic-
tions holding that the results of such tests are admissible in criminal proceedings.") See
supra note 24 for an explanation of the technique. General acceptance in the relevant
scientific field was not discussed. Also, in People v. Cole, 170 Ill. App. 3d 912, 524
N.E.2d 926 (1st Dist. 1988), the court applied the same reasoning as Johnson to declare
that atomic absorption analysis was admissible in Illinois for the purpose of determining
whether a suspect handled or fired a weapon. Id. at 928, 524 N.E.2d at 935-36. See also
People v. Ross, 191 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 548 N.E.2d 527 (1st Dist. 1989).
122. 188 Ill. App. 3d 833, 544 N.E.2d 1248 (4th Dist. 1989). See also People v.
Israel, 181 Ill. App. 3d 851, 861-62, 537 N.E.2d 1124, 1131 (2d Dist. 1989), which stated
that because the Frye standard applied to "whether a scientific principle, technique, or
test" is generally accepted, expert testimony placing a numerical score on the level of risk
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theory regarding pediatric head injuries.12 3 This recently devel-
oped.24 theory was based upon a study of three similarly injured
children.125 One article discussing the syndrome had been written
for a medical journal and an abstract was in the process of publica-
tion at the time of trial. 126 The Sandy court dutifully recognized
the Frye standard as well as the less stringent standard that the
appellate courts had applied in lieu of the Frye test for cases not
involving an intermediate mechanical step. 127 It also indicated that
"newness alone [does] not make the technique inadmissible, and
every theory must have its first day in court."' 2 The court con-
cluded that the evidence was admissible without explicitly stating
whether the court was following the "less stringent" standard of
Jennings, the more restrictive standard of Frye, or its own variation
of Frye. 129
Despite the general difference in the applications of the Frye test,
one line of cases in Illinois has applied Frye in a consistent manner.
These cases have identified the Frye test as the appropriate stan-
dard to determine the admissibility of electrophoresis, a blood-test-
ing technique that can classify blood more specifically than the
traditional A, B, and 0 blood grouping method.'1 ° The court first
that the defendant posed to the community was not subject to the Frye analysis. Id.
(emphasis in original).
123. Sandy, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 845, 544 N.E.2d at 1256. "Tin ear syndrome" is an
injury resulting from a combination of a physical impact to the head, shaking, and rota-
tion of the head. Id. at 839, 544 N.E.2d at 1251.
124. At the time of trial, the tin ear syndrome theory had been in existence for six
months. Sandy, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 839, 544 N.E.2d at 1251.
125. Id.
126. Id
127. Id.
128. Id. at 846, 544 N.E.2d at 1256 (citing United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th
Cir. 1970), which admitted the results of neutron-activation analysis despite its recent
origins).
129. Id. at 846-47, 544 N.E.2d at 1256. The Sandy court cryptically stated that,
although the theory was new, it employed tests and methods generally accepted. Fur-
ther, tin ear syndrome bore a resemblance to the "shaken child syndrome" about which
much was written. Id.
130. Electrophoresis involves the application of an electrical current to a blood sam-
ple for a period of time, causing the enzymes to separate into their protein components.
Robinson v. State, 47 Md. App. 558, 574, 425 A.2d 211, 220 (1981). The enzymes and
proteins are then sorted and classified. Id. A similar principle is used in DNA "finger-
printing." See generally Jonakait, supra note 35, at 833; Annotation, Admissibility, in
Criminal Cases, of Evidence of Electrophoresis of Dried Evidentiary Bloodstains, 66
A.L.R. 4th (1988). Illinois has taken judicial notice of the reliability of the ABO blood
grouping system. See People v. Bush, 103 Ill. App. 3d 5, 430 N.E.2d 514 (5th Dist.
1982); People v. Gillespie, 24 Ill. App. 3d 567, 321 N.E.2d 398 (2d Dist. 1974). For a
comprehensive review of the admissibility of the ABO blood test in other jurisdictions see
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addressed the admissibility of this test in People v. Harbold. 3 Ap-
plying the Frye general acceptance standard, the Harbold court
concluded that the widespread use of electrophoresis in crime labo-
ratories alone could not justify admitting the test results in the face
of scientific dispute over the technique's reliability. 3 2 Three years
later, in People v. Partee, aa the court held that electrophoresis is
generally accepted by forensic scientists as a reliable scientific tech-
nique and therefore is admissible in Illinois. 34
Appellate review of Illinois' application of Frye to cases involv-
ing genetic DNA identification tests 35 is forthcoming. 36 The
Annotation, Admissibility, Weight, and Sufficiency of Blood Grouping Tests in Criminal
Cases, 2 A.L.R. 4th 500 (1980).
131. 124 Ill. App. 3d 363, 464 N.E.2d 734 (1st Dist. 1984). More accurately,
Harbold was the first case after People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 430 N.E.2d 1070 (1980)
to consider the admissibility of electrophoresis. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying
text (discussion of how Baynes purportedly adopted Frye). People v. LaSumba, 92 Ill.
App. 3d 621, 414 N.E.2d 1318 (4th Dist.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 849 (1980), was the first
case to address the admissibility of evidence derived from electrophoresis.
132. Harbold, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 379, 464 N.E.2d at 747. The court stated that,
[w]e cannot hold that electrophoretic detection of genetic markers in field con-
ditions is unreliable as a matter of law, but we believe that some questions as to
scientific acceptance of the technique remain unanswered in this record and in
the case law. Should the State elect to retry this case, we believe that the de-
fendant and the people would be well served by the careful evaluation of this
evidence, mindful of ... Frye v. United States.
Id. at 381, 464 N.E.2d at 748.
The following year, in People v. Redman, 135 Ill. App. 3d 534, 481 N.E.2d 1272 (4th
Dist. 1985), the court accepted the "reliability" of the electrophoretic technique. Id. at
539, 481 N.E.2d at 1276. Redman is the only exception to the statement that Frye has
been applied regularly in cases involving the admissibility of electrophoresis. The court
did not cite Frye or Baynes, instead it relied on People v. LaSumba, 92 Ill. App. 3d 621,
414 N.E.2d 1318 (4th Dist.), cert. denied, 454 U.S 849 (1980), a case which predated
Baynes. Redman, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 539, 481 N.E.2d at 1276. The LaSumba court held
that the State met its burden of establishing "that the probative value of the evidence
would outweigh any prejudice or confusion that could result from its introduction."
LaSumba, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 626, 414 N.E.2d at 1322.
133. 157 Ill. App. 3d 231, 511 N.E.2d 1165 (1st Dist. 1987).
134. Id. at 261, 511 N.E.2d at 1185. The court indicated that questions existing
when Harbold was decided had since been answered. Id. at 262, 511 N.E.2d at 1185. See
also People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 215-16, 549 N.E.2d 268, 287 (1989) (general accept-
ance and reliability of electrophoretic testing need not be established by impartial, disin-
terested scientists); People v. Generally, 170 Ill. App. 3d 668, 674, 525 N.E.2d 106, 109
(5th Dist. 1988) (admission of electrophoresis test results upheld); People v. Bradney, 170
Ill. App. 3d 839, 861, 525 N.E.2d 112, 126 (4th Dist. 1988) (scientific community has
generally accepted electrophoretic analysis of dried bloodstains).
135. DNA profiling, commonly but perhaps inaccurately known as DNA "finger-
printing," is a modern identification technique that developed as a result of human genet-
ics research. Burk, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28
JURIMETRIcS 455, 455 (1988) (citing Jeffreys, Wilson & Thein, DNA Fingerprints and
Segregation of Multiple Markers in Human Pedigrees 39 Am. J. HUM. GEN. 11 (1986)).
The human body is composed of cells, each of which contains all the information needed
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highly publicized Gary Dotson137 and Jeanine Nicarico1 3 cases
to produce a complete human body. Kelly, Rankin & Wink, Method and Applications of
DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide for the Non-Scientist, Feb. 1987 CRIM. L. REV. 105, 105.
This information serves as a "human blueprint" that is carried in chromosomes com-
posed of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Id. In short, DNA "contains the chemically
encoded genetic information that determines each individual's physical makeup." Com-
ment, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77 CAL. L. REV.
665, 667 (1989) (citing J. WATSON, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 255 (2d ed.
1970)).
The mechanics of DNA profiling, at its simplest level, consist of isolating fragments of
the DNA molecule through electrophoresis and a series of chemical procedures. The
fragments then are subject to a manufactured, radioactive DNA "probe" that seeks out
and binds to certain appropriate DNA fragments. The resultant bands ultimately are
viewed and become the "fingerprint" from which identification is made. Hoeffel, The
Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defend-
ant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 471-75 (1990). For a more detailed scientific discussion of the
technique see D. WEATHERALL, THE NEW GENETICS AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (2d ed.
1985). See also Gill, Jeffreys & Werrett, Forensic Application of DNA 'Fingerprints', 318
NATURE 577 (1985); Gill, Lygo, Fowler, & Werrett, An Evaluation of DNA Fingerprint-
ingfor Forensic Purposes, 8 ELECTROPHORESIS 38 (1987); M. Hibbs, Applications of DNA
Fingerprinting: Truth Will Out, 139 NEW L. J. 619 (1989); Thompson & Ford, DNA
Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV.
45, 65-76 (1989); Williams, DNA Fingerprinting: A Revolutionary Technique in Forensic
Science and Its Probable Effects on Criminal Evidentiary Law, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 1
(1988); Comment, DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903
(1988); Annotation, Admissibility, In Prosecution For Sex-Related Offense, of Results of
Tests on Semen or Seminal Fluids, 75 A.L.R. 4th 897, 948-49 (1990).
136. Telephone interview with Thomas J. Difanis, Illinois State's Attorney, Cham-
paign County (March 29 1989).
137. Dotson was convicted in 1979 for the rape of Cathleen Crowell Webb. The case
appeared to be very straightforward: the victim positively identified her assailant, and
her story was supported by ample physical evidence. Frossard, When the Accuser Re-
cants: People v. Dotson, 14 LITIGATION 11 (Summer, 1988). In 1985, however, Webb
recanted her testimony against Dotson, claiming that she had lied. Id. Dotson's motion
for post-conviction relief was denied on the grounds that the recantation was not believa-
ble. Id. at 59.
In 1988, Illinois Governor James Thompson and Cook County prosecutors supported
Dotson's request for DNA genetic testing on blood samples and semen stains. The tests,
conducted by Alec Jeffreys (creator of the technique) in London, were inconclusive. [Ed-
itor's Note: Further tests suggested that Dotson did not commit the crime. Prosecutors
dropped the case against him and today, he is a free man. See Gorner & Kotulak, Gene
Screening: A Chance to Map Our Body's Future, Chicago Tribune, April 15, 1990, at 1,
zone C.]
For a thorough analysis of the Dotson case see J. Taylor, Rape and Women's Credibil-
ity: Problems of Recantations and False Accusations Echoed in the Case of Cathleen Crow-
ell Webb and Gary Dotson, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1987). See also Comment, Gary
Dotson as Victim: The Legal Response to Recanting Testimony, 35 EMORY L.J. 969
(1986); Comment, DNA Printing, supra note 135, at 694-95.
138. Ten-year-old Jeanine Nicarico was abducted, raped, and brutally murdered in
1983. Two of the three defendants, initially, convicted and placed on Death Row, ob-
tained a reversal by the Illinois Supreme Court on the grounds that they should have been
tried separately. People v. Hernandez, 121 Ill. 2d 293 (1988) and People v. Cruz, 121 Ill.
2d 328 (1988).
At the second trial, DNA test results were introduced into evidence. The tests elimi-
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have utilized the technique, proclaimed as "the greatest boon to
forensic medicine and law since fingerprinting." '39 The recent trial
of Vincent Lipscomb, the alleged "campus rapist" who terrorized
the University of Illinois community in 1988,110 has brought the
issue of DNA evidence's admissibility to the forefront. Lipscomb
was arrested for rape, and it took the jury seventy-five minutes to
reach a verdict that was based substantially on DNA fingerprinting
evidence. 141
Illinois, however, is not the first state to utilize DNA fingerprint-
ing as evidence of a crime. Prior to 1990, DNA testing data has
been used as evidence in over eighty criminal rape and murder tri-
als in twenty-seven states, and has led to at least sixty-four convic-
tions or guilty pleas. 142 Several appellate courts have reviewed the
technique's admissibility, and almost all have held it acceptable.' 43
nated Hernandez, but failed to eliminate Cruz. The tests also failed to eliminate as the
perpetrator a third man who was convicted of an unrelated, similar murder of another
young girl. Genetic Test Fails to Identify the Killer in Nicarico Abduction Case, Chicago
Tribune, Jan. 23, 1990, § 2, at 7, col. 1. The specific DNA test that was used is known as
polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which is less exact than other methods but capable of
producing usable DNA from old or degraded samples. Id. A more popular and far more
precise method is known as restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis (RFLP).
Id. See Hoeffel, supra note 135, at 471. [Editor's Note: Cruz again was convicted and
sentenced to death. The second Hernandez trial was declared a mistrial because of a
deadlocked jury.]
139. Hoeffel, supra note 135, at 466 (citing Marx, DNA Fingerprinting Takes the Wit-
ness Stand, 240 SCIENCE 1616 (1988) (quoting Mac MacLeod, State Attorney's Office,
Palatka, Florida)).
140. Thirteen sexual attacks occurred around the University of Illinois campus be-
tween April and September 1988. Man Held in Attacks Near U of I. Campus, Chicago
Tribune, Jan. 22, 1989, at 2, zone C. Lipscomb was arrested in January, 1989 for the
criminal sexual assault of a Champaign woman on August 26, 1988. Id. The police were
aided by the results of DNA genetic testing (obtained by warrant in September 1988, just
after the last of the series of rapes) on Lipscomb's blood, saliva, and hair. Id. The evi-
dence was admitted over strenuous objection by the defendant. Press Service Release,
U.P.I., Feb. 7, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file). Lipscomb has since been charged
with one other rape and remains a prime suspect in at least seven other campus assaults.
Id.
141. Rape Conviction in DNA Case, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 17, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
The DNA evidence was heavily relied upon because the victim did not see and could not
identify her assailant. Id. Telephone interview with Thomas J. Difanis, Champaign
County State's Attorney, March 29, 1990.
142. Barinaga, DNA Fingerprinting: Pitfalls Come to Light, 339 NATURE 89 (1989).
Several jurisdictions have subsequently considered the technique's admissibility, and the
list is growing rapidly. See, e.g., DNA Prints Help Win Conviction in 2 Rapes, L.A.
Times, March 16, 1990, § B1, col. 3 (Los Angeles trial); DNA Evidence Admissible in
Rape Trial, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1990, § Bl, col. 6 (San Diego trial).
143. See Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694, 695, 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(probability of another DNA "match" to be 1 in 234 billion is admissible); Andrews v.
State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850-51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 542 So. 2d 1332
(Fla. 1989) (DNA print identification tests admissible under relevancy standard); Cobey
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The Virginia Supreme Court was the first state supreme court to
consider DNA printing's admissibility.'" Affirming the death pen-
alty of Timothy Spencer, the court held that "[t]he record is replete
with uncontradicted expert testimony that no 'dissent whatsoever
[exists] in the scientific community' concerning the reliability of
the DNA printing technique." '145 Unlike Illinois, however, Vir-
ginia does not follow the Frye rule." In State v. Schwartz,147 the
Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed the applicability of Frye 14
and held that DNA typing had gained general acceptance in the
scientific community. 4 9 The evidence was not admitted, however,
because the laboratory did not comply with "appropriate standards
and controls."150
Contending that the technique lacks quality control and consis-
tency, there are many who argue that, despite its warm reception
v. State, 80 Md. App. 31, 43, 559 A.2d 391, 398 (1989) (the trial judge did not err in
finding that DNA "fingerprinting" generally was accepted in the scientific community
based upon the record before it); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 ("DNA foren-
sic identification tests to determine exclusion are reliable and meet the Frye standard of
admissibility"); People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 332, 533 N.Y.S. 2d 643, 659 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 1988). In Wesley, the court stated, "DNA fingerprinting-its under-
lying principles, procedures and technology-is a scientific test that is reliable and has
gained general acceptance in the scientific community and in the particular fields thereof
in which it belongs-to wit, molecular biology, population genetics and diverse other
branches of genetics, chemistry, biology, and biochemistry." Id. Cf Simkunas v. Tardi,
720 F. Supp. 687, 696 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (DNA testing, conducted by agreement of the
parties, was discussed but was held irrelevant for purposes of summary judgment); Yorke
v. State, 556 A.2d 230, 236 (Md. 1989) (trial court did not err in denying a new trial on
the basis of newly discovered DNA evidence showing that the victim's vaginal wash did
not match the defendant's DNA pattern).
144. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 850 (Va. 1989); Spencer v. Common-
wealth, 384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989) [hereinafter "Spencer I"]; Spencer v. Commonwealth,
384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989) [hereinafter "Spencer IF'].
145. Spencer II, 384 S.E.2d at 797.
146. See O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 695-96, 364 S.E.2d 491, 504 (1988).
The Spencer court indicated, however, that even if it had followed the' Frye rule, the
evidence would have been admissible. Spencer I, 384 S.E.2d at 783 n. 10; Spencer II, 384
S.E.2d at 797 n.Il.
147. 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
148. Id. at 424.
149. Id. at 428.
150. Id. See also State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989), in which the court
stated
[a]s to DNA typing analysis, we find that the reliability of these tests is now
generally accepted by geneticists, biochemists, and the like .... This does not,
however, mean that DNA tests should always be admitted. Expert testimony
may be received to impeach the particular procedures employed in a specific
test or the reliability of results obtained.
Id. at 260.
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by the courts, DNA testing is unreliable. I 1 These concerns are
justified when one considers that crime laboratories suffer from an
alarmingly high rate of error. 15 2 The fear of unreliability stems
from the highly technical nature of the test: unlike fingerprint or
bite mark evidence, DNA typing is incapable of observation and
requires the jury to rely upon the skill of the technician and to
accept or reject the expert witnesses conclusion on faith. 153
Given the varied application of Frye in Illinois, DNA testing is
likely to gain acceptance either because of its reliability or its gen-
eral acceptance in the scientific community. Questions regarding
the admissibility of DNA evidence, however, will provide Illinois
courts an the opportunity to reevaluate their current, confusing ap-
proach to admitting scientific evidence.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Criticism of Frye
The foregoing background discussion demonstrates that Frye
has been applied selectively in Illinois ever since its adoption. 154
Illinois courts differ widely in their interpretations. Some have de-
termined that the Frye test applies to evidence involving only an
intermediate mechanical stage. Other courts have different opin-
ions regarding precisely what constitutes scientific evidence,'5 5 gen-
151. Despite numerous media representations of its virtual accuracy and undisputed
reliability, DNA identification testing does have a growing number of critics. See Hoef-
fel, supra note 135, at 466 ("[mrembers of the stunned defense bar have only recently
come to life to launch a serious attack on the reliability of the evidence") (citing R.
McFadden, New York Judge's Ruling Challenges Reliability of DNA Tests, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 15, 1989, at A16, col. 1). See also DNA Identity Tests Called Unreliable, Chicago
Tribune, Jan. 29, 1990, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
152. See Bretz, supra note 34, at 511 (only 30% of the labs participating in the pro-
ject were able correctly to exclude two individuals who were not associated with the
sample and identify the one individual who was); Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 555
(FDA officials charging that as many as 10% of the clinical researchers in the United
States do "something less than [honest research]") (citing W. BROAD & N. WADE, BE-
TRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 83 (1983); Bechtel, Medical Tests: Don't Bet Your Life on
Them, PREVENTION, Jan. 1983, at 55 (1983) (estimating 4 million erroneous test results
daily); Imwinkelried, Will High-Tech Sleuthing Hold Up in Court?: Judges and Juries
Should Be Skeptical of Forensic Scientists' Claims, NEWSDAY, March 17, 1988, at 89
(noting Census For Disease Control study in 1985 that showed some laboratories erred
more than 60% of the time in determining the presence of illegal drugs).
153. See generally Annotation, Admissibility, In Prosecution for Sex-Related Offense,
of Results of Tests on Semen or Seminal Fluids, 75 A.L.R. 4th 897, 949 (1990).
154. See supra notes 80-134 and accompanying text. See supra notes 73-80 and ac-
companying text (the initial adoption of Frye in Baynes was not explicit).
155. Varying definitions of "scientific evidence" lead to a selective application of Frye
because a determination that the evidence is not "scientific" means that Frye is
inapplicable.
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eral acceptance, and the relevant scientific community.
First, the Illinois courts' inconsistent approach is particularly
evident in the cases applying Frye to procedures involving an inter-
mediate mechanical stage, i.e., interpretation of data obtained from
mechanical equipment. Appellate courts have not consistently rec-
ognized the distinction between a visual comparison and an inter-
mediate mechanical stage. Given this inconsistent application and
because the theory lacks Illinois Supreme Court approval, its via-
bility is suspect. Moreover, the notion of an intermediate mechani-
cal stage is vague and subjective.
For example, under the "pink tooth theory," strangulation could
be one of several causes of death if a decedent has pink teeth.15 6 It
would seem that photographs that indicate a pinkish tinge to a de-
cedent's teeth involve merely a visual comparison. The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, has ruled that expert testimony regard-
ing the "pink tooth theory" must be based upon scientific theories
that have gained general acceptance in the expert's field. 117 Thus,
the court implies that the pink tooth theory does not rely merely
on a visual comparison but involves an intermediate mechanical
stage.
A similar problem arises when a court considers evidence ob-
tained from the "superglue" (cyanoacrylate) technique that sub-
jects latent fingerprints to superglue fumes in order to enhance the
print. 158 In addition to the difficulty in determining whether this
procedure involves an intermediate mechanical stage, 159 considera-
156. People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 197-98, 469 N.E.2d 569, 572 (1984).
157. Id at 208-09, 469 N.E.2d at 576-77.
158. People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 549 N.E.2d 268 (1989). The Eyler court did not
discuss the line of cases holding Frye inapplicable to scientific evidence not involving an
intermediate mechanical stage: "We reject the State's argument, unsupported by any
citations to authority, that the Frye test does not apply to this particular technique." Id
at 211, 549 N.E.2d at 285. This statement could be viewed as an outright rejection of the
intermediate mechanical stage distinction. Whether it will be interpreted as such remains
to be seen.
159. Determining whether the evidence involves an intermediate mechanical stage
also proves troublesome in situations not yet addressed by Illinois courts. For example,
the question has arisen whether computer animation involves an intermediate mechanical
step or is merely another form of displaying evidence to the jury. While some may argue
that animation is only as good as the factual information put into it, others point out that
an object can appear to change speed or direction by altering the point from where it is
viewed. Thus, the evidence may be technically correct but still may be misleading: the
medium shapes the message. Marcotte, Animated Evidence: Delta 191 Crash Re-Created
Through Computer Simulations at Trial, 75 A.B.A.J. 52, 55-56 (December 1989). Cf
French v. City of Springfield, 65 Ill. 2d 74, 357 N.E.2d 438 (1976) (admission of a film
that recreated the plaintiff's version of an auto accident was held to be error because it
tended to precondition the jury to accept plaintiff's version of the facts).
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tion of this technique detracts the court from its primary concern:
determining whether the technique is sufficiently reliable and ac-
cepted to admit its results into evidence.
Another problem with the intermediate mechanical stage dis-
tinction is that it can negate Frye's original purpose. Scientific evi-
dence that involves only a visual analysis can be as prejudicial as
evidence involving an intermediate mechanical stage because it
may convey a similar "aura of infallibility."' "w Perhaps it is for this
reason that the Illinois Supreme Court applied Frye to hypnotically
induced testimony1 6 ' even though the process does not involve an
intermediate mechanical step. Similarly, the fourth district has ap-
plied Frye to blood spatter analysis although the technique involves
visual analysis only.' 62 Thus, the intermediate mechanical stage
distinction has led to the Frye standard's selective application.
63
Second, differing opinions regarding the precise definition of
"scientific evidence" have also led to a selective application of the
Frye standard. A concise definition of scientific evidence is con-
spicuously absent from both case law and academic journals."6 In
Illinois, no bright line separates scientific evidence from other
forms of opinion testimony. Rather, it appears that almost all fo-
rensic evidence is deemed to be scientific evidence, as well as any
evidence involving an analysis or process that must be supplanted
by scientific expert testimony.' 65 An analysis of one's shoe-wear
pattern 66 or handprint' 61 is considered scientific evidence because
an expert is needed to analyze detailed measurements. A scoring
technique to determine a defendant's dangerousness to the commu-
nity, however, was not deemed to be scientific evidence because the
rating system was nothing more than an express statement of the
160. See supra note 13 (discussion of ways in which scientific evidence may mislead a
jury).
161. See People v. Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d 284, 293-95, 546 N.E.2d 513, 518 (1989); see also
supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (discussion of hypnotically induced testimony).
162. People v. Owens, 155 Ill. App. 3d 990, 508 N.E.2d 1088 (4th Dist. 1987); see
supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text (blood spatter technique discussed). See also
supra note 158 (rejected intermediate mechanical stage distinction in "superglue" case).
163. See also People v. Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1, 526 N.E.2d 525 (2d Dist. 1988)
(shoe-wear pattern). The court ultimately used both the Frye test and the "less stringent"
standard used for evidence involving only visual comparison. Id. at 9-11, 526 N.E.2d at
531-32.
164. See also supra note 11 (discussion of what constitutes scientific evidence).
165. Cf Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 554 (citing Clark, Scientific Evidence, in THE
PROSECUTOR's DESKBOOK 542 (P. Healy & J. Manak eds. 1969)) (scientific evidence is
"the backbone of every circumstantial evidence case").
166. Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 5-6, 526 N.E.2d at 528-29.
167. People v. Columbo, 118 Ill. App. 3d 882, 455 N.E.2d 733 (1st Dist. 1983).
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weight the expert gave each factor in its contribution to defend-
ant's dangerousness.1 68
Prior to 1989, Illinois appellate courts had held that hypnoti-
cally induced testimony was not subject to the Frye analysis be-
cause it involved eyewitness testimony rather than scientific
evidence. 69 Such testimony was therefore admissible. Although
People v. Zayas 170 rejected this reasoning, the treatment of hypnoti-
cally induced evidence presents yet another illustration of the way
in which differing definitions of scientific evidence can lead to in-
consistent application of the Frye test and disparate decisions on
the admissibility of certain scientific evidence. Today, Illinois no
longer admits hypnotically induced recall because the technique
has not been generally accepted as scientifically accurate. 7 '
Problems also arise because courts are unclear as to the standard
they should use when they decide not to apply Frye. Some courts
use their own judgment of reliability based on the particular facts
before them. For example, the People v. Sandy 72 court took refuge
in the methods the doctor used to reach his conclusion because
they were "methods accepted by everyone.""' In other words, the
court accepted the conclusions because the methodology, rather
than the novel theory involved, was acceptable. 74
Most Illinois courts that decline to apply Frye, or that apply
Frye in their own way,'17 use some form of a general reliability
standard. Under this approach, scientific evidence generally need
not be accepted if its reliability can otherwise be established. In
People v. Hendricks,7 6 for example, the court allowed testimony
168. People v. Israel, 181 Ill. App. 3d 851, 537 N.E.2d 1124 (2d Dist. 1989). Cf.
Annotation, Admissibility of Results of Computer Analysis of Defendant's Mental State, 37
A.L.R. 4th 510, 512-13 (1985) (the general acceptance and reliability of computerized
data regarding a defendant's mental condition is a critical issue).
169. See People v. Gibson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368 (4th Dist. 1983);
People v. Cohoon, 120 Ill. App. 3d 62, 457 N.E.2d 998 (5th Dist. 1982); supra notes 81-
92 and accompanying text (admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony discussed).
170. 131 Ill. 2d 284, 546 N.E.2d 513 (1989) (hypnotically induced testimony inadmis-
sible under Frye analysis).
171. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (Gibson and Zayas discussed).
172. People v. Sandy, 188 Ill. App. 3d 833, 544 N.E.2d 1248 (4th Dist. 1989).
173. Id at 847, 544 N.E.2d at 1256. It is unclear whether the Sandy court was apply-
ing Frye, a variation of Frye, or its own standard in light of the facts before it. See supra
note 129 and accompanying text (discussion of the standard Sandy applied).
174. 188 Ill. App. 3d at 846-47, 544 N.E.2d at 1256.
175. See infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text (discussion of the varying ways
courts have interpreted general acceptance and relevant scientific field).
176. 145 Ill. App. 3d 71, 495 N.E.2d 85 (4th Dist. 1986). The defendant was found
guilty of murdering of his wife and three children. He was sentenced to four consecutive
terms of natural life imprisonment. Id. at 79, 495 N.E.2d at 91.
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that offered an estimated time of death based upon an analysis of
the victim's stomach contents. 177 The court held the evidence suffi-
ciently reliable despite a potential lack of general scientific
acceptance.178
Courts that believe Frye applies only to evidence involving an
intermediate mechanical stage have used a general reliability stan-
dard. For example, the court in People v. Columbo 179 concluded
that Frye did not apply to hand print analysis because it involved
only visual comparison. 180 Citing People v. Jennings, 8' the court
explained in dicta that Illinois historically adhered to a "more lib-
eral" reliability test, rather than the general acceptance standard
set forth under Frye. 18 2 The court went further by concluding that
177. Id. at 99, 495 N.E.2d at 105. See also People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 387,
356 N.E.2d 1350, 1352 (2d Dist. 1976) (contents of stomach used to determine time of
death was used in trial court but its admissibility was not contested on appeal).
178. Hendricks, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 99, 495 N.E.2d at 104. The experts disagreed
with each other on several grounds and at least one testified that a dispute existed in the
scientific community over the use of gastric analysis to determine time of death. Id. at
90-91, 99, 495 N.E.2d at 99-100, 104. The evidence was admitted, however, to provide an
estimated range of time of death instead of an exact time of death. Id. at 99, 495 N.E.2d
at 104. In admitting the evidence, the court stated that, "general scientific acceptance is
not a prerequisite if the evidence is otherwise shown to be reliable .... A dispute in the
scientific community about the reliability of a method goes to the weight of the evidence."
Id. at 98, 495 N.E.2d at 104.
179. 118 Ill. App. 3d 882, 455 N.E.2d 733 (1st Dist. 1983).
180. Id. at 960, 455 N.E.2d at 789.
181. People v. Jennings, 252 11. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911). Those cases using a relia-
bility standard usually cite Jennings as support. See, e.g., People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App.
3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (2d Dist. 1976) (bite mark analysis). The Milone court discussed
Frye and Jennings but distinguished them on the grounds that those cases involved an
intermediate mechanical stage. 43 Ill. App. 3d at 396, 356 N.E.2d at 1358. Stating that
bite mark evidence was analogous to footprint, fingerprint, and hair comparisons, the
court concluded that the bite mark evidence served only to "lend assistance to the trial
court in interpreting physical evidence not within the ken of the average trial judge's
knowledge" and was therefore admissible. Id. The Milone court's analysis of Jennings,
however, was inaccurate. In Jennings, the court admitted fingerprints into evidence
based upon their reliability and "common use." See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying
text. The court conducted a thorough investigation of the fingerprinting technique and
the theory upon which it was based. Jennings, 252 Ill. at 546-49, 96 N.E. at 1081-83. If
bite marks are analogous to fingerprints, as the Milone court asserted, then the court
should have followed Jennings. The Milone court, however, did consider that other juris-
dictions had reviewed the technique, and it mentioned scientific journals that discussed
the subject. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 397-98, 356 N.E.2d at 1359-60 (citing People v.
Johnson, 8 Ill. App. 3d 457, 289 N.E.2d 722 (3d Dist. 1972)).
182. Columbo, 118 Il. App. 3d at 959, 455 N.E.2d at 789. Columbo described Jen-
nings inaccurately. The court in People v. Ferguson, 172 Ill App. 3d 1, 526 N.E.2d 525
(2d Dist. 1988) (shoe-wear pattern analysis), correctly recognized that the Jennings deci-
sion considers, like Frye, general acceptance as well as reliability. Ferguson, 172 Ill. App.
3d at 10, II, 526 N.E.2d at 532. Jennings recognized the evidence's admissibility only
after concluding "that experience has shown it to be reliable" and that it was "in such
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evidence for which there is no intermediate mechanical stage is ad-
missible once a competent expert testifies that the scientific process
in question is reliable.18 3 Evidence of disagreement among the ex-
perts would bear upon the weight, not the admissibility, of the evi-
dence. I" Columbo marks a significant departure from both the
Frye test and the substantially similar Jennings standard because
the opinion of one expert is sufficient to admit a novel scientific
technique. Use of this standard fails to prevent the jury from over-
emphasizing scientific data that may in fact be unreliable and inac-
curate. Columbo thus undermines the important policy supporting
the Frye decision.
In addition to the confusion surrounding the issue of when Frye
applies, judicial determinations of what is required in order for the
general acceptance standard to be met are perhaps even more con-
fusing.18 5 Depending upon the court and the nature of the evi-
dence under review, Illinois courts have used different variations of
the Frye test. The fundamental explanation for this inconsistency
lies with the common error of treating the general acceptance re-
quirement as synonymous with a reliability standard.
The cases involving the admissibility of hypnotically induced
testimony usually have applied the general acceptance standard the
Frye court contemplated. 1 6  In People v. Zayas,8 7 the Illinois
Supreme Court disallowed evidence because of disagreement in the
scientific community over its accuracy.' 8  The court did not sub-
stantially inquire into the methodology or the theory of the tech-
general and common use that the courts [could not] refuse to take judicial cognizance of
it." Jennings, 252 Inl. at 546-47, 549, 96 N.E. at 1081, 1082. See supra notes 65-66 and
accompanying text.
183. Columbo, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 960, 455 N.E.2d at 790.
184. Id. See also supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussion of expert testi-
mony); infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text (differing expert opinion goes to the
weight, rather than the admissibility of the evidence).
185. See generally supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text (general acceptance stan-
dard discussed).
186. The Frye court required general acceptance by the relevant scientific community
as a means of ensuring reliability. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923), generally discussed supra notes 15-45 and accompanying text.
187. 131 Ill. 2d 284, 546 N.E.2d 513 (1989).
188. Id. at 294-95, 546 N.E.2d at 518. See also People v. Bradney, 170 Ill. App. 3d
839, 861, 525 N.E.2d 112, 126 (4th Dist. 1988) (electrophoretic analysis of dried blood-
stains generally accepted in the scientific community); People v. Partee, 157 Ill. App.
231, 511 N.E.2d 1165 (1st Dist. 1987) (electrophoretic analysis generally accepted by
forensic scientists as a reliable method of detecting genetic markers in blood); People v.
Harbold, 124 Ill. App. 3d 363, 464 N.E.2d 734 (1st Dist. 1984) (unanswered questions
concerning the scientific acceptance of the technique).
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nique. It correctly 8 9 noted only a lack of general acceptance
among those who were qualified to review it.' 9°
Other courts have adopted a definition of "general acceptance"
that focuses more upon the general reliability of the evidence
rather than its acceptance among members of the relevant scientific
community. In People v. Johnson,'19 for example, the court admit-
ted the results of a neutron activation analysis because a majority
of other jurisdictions had accepted the test as a reliable tech-
nique. 192 The court stated that any lack of certainty would go to
the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. 193 Thus,
Johnson departs from Frye and substitutes for the general accept-
ance requirement a less stringent variation. Similarly, in People v.
Cole,194 the court admitted atomic absorption analysis because of
its general reliability, not because of its general acceptance. 195
Third, several variations of Frye have developed as a result of
difficulty in determining the "relevant scientific community."' 96
The court in People v. Harbold 197 stated that the widespread, na-
tional use of genetic marker evidence (electrophoresis) in crime
labs could not justify its admission "in the face of a bonafide scien-
tific dispute."' 98 Thus, for the Harbold court, the relevant scien-
tific community extended beyond the state scientists working in
crime labs. 99 Yet, in People v. Eyler,2" the court allowed evidence
resulting from a "superglue" fingerprint technique20 1 because for
several years it was routinely used by the Chicago Police Depart-
ment and was considered reliable by those working in the field of
189. Proponents of Frye have consistently argued that the general acceptance stan-
dard relieves judges from having to make scientific determinations. United States v. Ad-
dison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974). According to Addison, a correct
application of Frye does not involve a judicial analysis of the methodology or theory
behind the technique: "[t]he requirement of general acceptance in the scientific commu-
nity assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific method
will have the determinative voice." Id.
190. Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d at 294-95, 546 N.E.2d at 518-19.
191. 114 Ill. 2d 170, 499 N.E.2d 1355 (1986)
192. Id. at 197, 499 N.E.2d at 1367.
193. Id.
194. 170 Ill. App. 3d 912, 524 N.E.2d 926 (1st Dist. 1988).
195. Id. at 927, 524 N.E.2d at 935.
196. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text (scientific field discussed).
197. 124 Ill. App. 3d 363, 464 N.E.2d 734 (5th Dist. 1988).
198. Id. at 379, 464 N.E.2d at 747.
199. Id.
200. 133 Ill. 2d 173, 549 N.E.2d 268 (1989).
201. Id. at 208-09, 549 N.E.2d at 284. See also supra note 158 and accompanying
text ("superglue" technique explained).
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fingerprint examination and comparison, including the FBI.'
The relevant scientific field in Eyler was therefore much more nar-
row than the field defined in Harbold. The broader the definition
of the relevant scientific field, the more difficult it becomes to estab-
lish general acceptance within that field and, consequently, to ad-
mit evidence under Frye. Thus the different constructions of the
scientific field lead to different constructions and applications of
the Frye rule.20 3
There are many benefits to the Frye standard.2° Since its adop-
tion in Illinois, however, the courts have had difficulty determining
when to apply the standard and, when it is applied, applying it in a
uniform fashion. This difficulty has resulted in judicial confusion
and has denied both plaintiffs and defendants the ability to accu-
rately pinpoint the legal standard this state uses to determine the
admissibility of scientific evidence.
B. An Alternative to Frye
Before reviewing an alternative to Frye, it must be mentioned
that Illinois has joined other states by beginning to adopt the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence ("FRE"). °5 Federal Rules 703206 and
705207 have already been adopted in Illinois.208 Moreover, Illinois
courts have begun to accept the definition of relevant evidence
202. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d at 212, 549 N.E.2d at 285. Although the supergiue technique
probably is generally accepted as reliable in a broader relevant scientific field, the practice
of using such a limited field to determine general acceptance could be problematic. See
infra note 203 and accompanying text.
203. See generally Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978). In
Reed, the court discounted the notion that scientists in the field of speech and hearing
should be eliminated from the relevant field of experts and that only those who have
performed voiceprint experiments should be admitted. ("The purpose of the Frye test is
defeated by an approach which allows a court to ignore the informed opinions of a sub-
stantial segment of the scientific community which stands in opposition to the process in
question.")
204. See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text (discussion of the Frye benefits).
205. M. Kadish & R. Kling, Illinois Judicial Conference, Associate Judge Seminar
309 (March 1989).
206. FED. R. EVID. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particu-
lar field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence.
207. FED. R. EVID. 705 provides: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or
inference and give reasons therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or
data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
208. Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981).
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under FRE 401 and the balancing test of FRE 403.209 Other fed-
eral rules that could have an impact on the continued viability of
Frye include Rules 401210 402,21 702,212 and 703.213 Illinois' adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence could lead to the Frye stan-
dard falling into disuse. 2 4 The federal rules curiously are silent as
to whether they encompass the general acceptance standard enun-
ciated in Frye.21 Moreover, the rules manifest a "spirit of liberal
admissibility" that threatens the inherently conservative nature of
the Frye test.21 6 All but two federal circuits, however, still purport
to apply the Frye standard.217 Additionally, the continued applica-
tion of the Frye rule is not inherently inconsistent with the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence because they were never
intended to be a comprehensive codification of evidentiary rules.
Many common law rules such as Frye that are either not addressed
or treated only in a general fashion under the federal rules have
209. M. Kadish & R. Kling, Illinois Judicial Conference, Associate Judge Seminar
309 (March 1989).
210. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussion of FED. R. EvID. 401).
211. FED. R. EvID. 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
212. FED. R. EvID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
213. See supra note 206 (text of FED. R. EVID. 703).
214. See generally Note, Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Ad-
missibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 774 (1980).
215. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1229, states that "[tihe [Frye test] is simply ignored
in the Advisory Committee's Notes, congressional committee reports, floor debates, and
hearings. Some courts and commentators assume that Frye remains the applicable stan-
dard, while others reject this view." [footnotes omitted] Id. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702, at 716 ("[T]he silence of the rule [702] and its
drafters should be regarded as tantamount to an abandonment of the general acceptance
standard."); SALTZBURG & REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 452 (3d
ed. 1982) ("[iut would be odd if the Advisory Committee and the Congress intended to
overrule the vast majority of cases excluding such evidence as lie detectors without ex-
plicitly stating so.") See generally United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234-35
(1985) (concluding that the Federal Rules of Evidence neither incorporate nor repudiate
the Frye standard).
216. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237 ("[I]n its pristine form the general acceptance
standard reflects a conservative approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence that is
at odds with the spirit, if not the precise language, of the Federal Rules of Evidence.")
217. Bretz, supra note 34, at 507 n.5. The eighth and second circuits do not apply
Frye. States not applying Frye are Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Montana, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming. Id.
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remained viable.21 8
Notwithstanding the potential impact of the Federal Rules of
Evidence on the future of Frye, commentators have recommended
numerous alternatives to the standard,21 9 including that the degree
of required acceptance be modified,22° that an independent tribunal
such as a "science court" should review novel scientific techniques
prior to any courtroom introduction,221 and that the standard
should be abandoned.222 Finally, a return to the traditional rele-
vancy standard has been suggested. In criminal cases the propo-
nent of the scientific evidence would have to establish its reliability
beyond a reasonable doubt before it could be admitted.223
Modifying the degree of required acceptance does not solve the
problems of inconsistent application and interpretation. Certainly,
a requirement more conservative than general acceptance would
add to the controversy surrounding Frye. One of the reasons why
Frye has become subject to so much modification is that courts
have been unwilling to apply a strict requirement to evidence that
they feel is otherwise reliable.224 Fashioning a stricter requirement
will only invite further manipulation of the test and result in more
confusion. Making the degree of required acceptance less strict,
such as by requiring substantial instead of general scientific accept-
ance,225 does not substitute a standard that is any less amorphous
or difficult to define as general acceptance.
The idea of creating an expert tribunal to evaluate and pass judg-
ment on the validity and reliability of new scientific developments
would require such a radical departure from normal trial proce-
218. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1229. Impeachment by evidence of bias, for exam-
ple, is not mentioned in the Rules. Id. at 1229 n.251.
219. McCormick, supra note 20, at 905. In addition to the alternatives listed in the
text see Black, supra note 45, at 595; Elliot, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three
Approaches For Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U.L. REv. 487 (1989); Moenssens,
supra note 1, at 545.
220. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
221. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. REv. 1058 (1977). See also
Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1231-32, 1232 n.269.
222. McCormick, supra note 20, at 879.
223. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1245-50.
224. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985) (under Frye,
"courts may be required to exclude much probative and reliable information from the
jury's consideration, thereby impeding the truth-seeking function of litigation.") See also
supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (ways in which Frye impedes the truth-seeking
process).
225. J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 2.5, at 24 (2d ed. 1974).
See United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
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dures that it is not likely to gain much support.226 Moreover, the
question would ultimately become whether the expert tribunal
would be required to apply Frye.227
Some cases228 and commentators have suggested abandoning
Frye altogether and adhering to the traditional relevancy stan-
dard.229 Thus, the admissibility of a novel scientific technique
would depend upon its probative value as balanced against any
dangers of confusion, unfair prejudice, or misleading of the jury.230
The simplicity of this approach makes it appealing because it in-
corporates concepts that are understood and routinely used by
both judges and attorneys. 231 The court would handle scientific ev-
idence as it would any other evidence, that is, by balancing factors
within the framework of general relevancy and expert testimony
rules. 23
2
The relevancy approach has been criticized, however, for failing
to protect against the admission of unreliable scientific evidence
adequately.233 One problem is that a court's assessment of the pro-
bative worth of a novel scientific technique and its potential for
misleading the jury will often result in reliance on the opinion of
one or two experts.234  Also, the relevancy approach assumes that
the factfinder is capable of evaluating novel scientific evidence. 235
226. See Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1231-32; Maletskos & Spielman, supra note 32,
at 962.
227. McCormick, supra note 20, at 908. Admittedly, the tribunal could become an
excellent forum for taking a survey of scientific opinion. Id. Despite this convenience,
critics maintain that a special tribunal might prove to be both time consuming and incon-
clusive. Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through The Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 817, 826-828 (1977).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (1985).
229. Also known as the "McCormick" view. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1203.
230. The standard in FED. R. EvID. 403, discussed supra note 9. See also Giannelli,
supra note 11, at 1235 ("the admissibility of a novel scientific technique would depend on
a three-step process: first, the probative value of the evidence would be determined; sec-
ond, dangers such as the potential of the evidence to mislead the jury would be identified;
and third, the probative value would be balanced against the identified dangers.")
231. McCormick, supra note 20, at 916. McCormick states that "[i]n sum, all values
that have been advanced in support of retaining the Frye standard can be furthered with-
out it. The evolutionary erosion and abrogation of the standard have produced a synthe-
sis that has given greater precision and concreteness to those values. The only significant
loss has been its rigidity and artificiality." Id. at 911.
232. Id. at 908-09.
233. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1239.
234. Id. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussion of the danger in-
herent in limiting the number of experts who testify).
235. Because most techniques will pass the threshold requirements of admissibility,
the deficiencies of the technique will get exposed before the jury. Giannelli, supra note
11, at 1239.
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Especially in complex cases, a jury may not be able to do so. 236
One commentator has argued that the relevancy approach may
be acceptable for civil cases, but not for criminal trials; 3 7 he fur-
ther suggests that novel scientific evidence requires a special bur-
den of proof. He argues that requiring proof of reliability of a
scientific technique beyond a reasonable doubt would allay any
fears of finding a criminal defendant guilty based on evidence of
dubious reliability. 238 This proposition imposes an enhanced bur-
den on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence in criminal
cases and rejects the ambiguous general acceptance standard es-
poused by Frye. Consequently, many of the problems associated
with the application of Frye would be avoided.
Critics of this approach argue that it is unnecessary.239
Although the concern for reliability is admirable, most courts re-
jecting Frye have determined that the balancing process is sufficient
to preclude the admission of unreliable scientific evidence.2' As a
practical matter, it is much more convenient for a court to apply
the tried and true balancing process of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence than to use an entirely new standard without precedent.
Barring any legislative action, it thus is unlikely that this approach
will be adopted.
Concerns over the admission of unreliable evidence would be
eliminated if a court applies, not just a simple balancing test, but
one that considers in some detail factors weighing probativeness
236. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1240. It is not that jurors are unintelligent, but
choosing among conflicting experts can be difficult. As one witness stated, "The expert
witnesses did a good job of bringing things right down to our level.... The only problem
was that they didn't agree with .each other. It was pretty confusing." Science in the
Court, 101 U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP. 91 (Nov. 10, 1986).
237. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1246. Professor Giannelli takes the position that a
special burden should be placed on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence:
[t]he introduction of unreliable evidence that has a significant potential to influ-
ence a jury greatly increases the likelihood of an erroneous verdict. In effect,
the relevancy approach places the burden on the party opposing admissibility-
typically the defendant in a criminal case. Instead of the prosecution carrying a
substantial burden of establishing the reliability of a novel scientific technique,
the defendant must shoulder the burden of establishing unreliability.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
238. Id. at 1247-48. For a critique of Professor Giannelli's proposal see McCormick,
supra note 20, at 908.
239. McCormick, supra note 20, at 908 ("the purpose of the [beyond a reasonable
doubt] requirement would be to emphasize the caution necessary in admitting novel sci-
entific evidence. An appellate court can accomplish the same purpose more directly by
prescribing and practicing such caution. The criminal case context is sufficient basis for
doing so. Adopting a special burden of proof rule may obscure the real issues and add a
requirement that is more symbolic than substantial.")
240. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (1985).
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against prejudice.24' One commentator's exhaustive list of recom-
mended factors would be ideal for such an extended balancing test.
This type of balancing would ensure that the reliability of a tech-
nique is deliberated thoroughly and that the admissibility decision
is thoughtfully considered.242 Most importantly, the integrity of
the judicial process is preserved. The relevancy approach to admit-
ting scientific evidence, coupled with a mandatory balancing of the
"special" factors, is a simple, effective, and workable alternative to
the Frye test if the required range of factors is broad enough to
permit the court to make an informed decision about the admissi-
bility of novel, even controversial scientific data and techniques.
Moreover, many of the problems associated with Frye and high-
lighted by this Article would be eliminated. The areas of concern
that have proven most difficult for the courts to analyze--defining
scientific evidence, general acceptance, and relevant scientific com-
munity-would assume less significance because they would be
part of a multi-factor balancing scheme.
By requiring a court to follow a detailed balancing scheme based
on specific factors, the court will be forced to analyze the ver-
ifiability of the techniques used and the general accuracy of the
scientific method employed. The most significant "safety" feature
of the balancing test advocated here is that the evidence will always
be excluded if it would prejudice the defendant or confuse the is-
sues, a feature noticeably absent from the Frye test.
Illinois courts would benefit from the adoption of a relevancy
approach to scientific evidence because it furnishes a consistent,
unified framework for admissibility. The method also provides
flexibility and, coupled with a requirement that the "special" fac-
tors be addressed, encourages a weighing of every pertinent consid-
eration that has an impact on the reliability of a scientific technique
in a particular case.243
241. See generally McCormick, supra note 20, at 911-12. McCormick suggests using
the following eleven factors: (1) the potential error rate in using the technique, (2) the
existence and maintenance of standards governing its use, (3) presence of safeguards in
the characteristics of the technique, (4) analogy to other scientific techniques whose re-
suits are admissible, (5) the extent to which the technique has been accepted by scientists
in the field involved, (6) the nature and breadth of the inference adduced, (7) the clarity
and simplicity with which the technique can be described and its results explained, (8) the
extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury, (9) the availability of
other experts to test and evaluate the technique, (10) the probative significance of the
evidence in the circumstances of the case, and (11) the care with which the technique was
employed in the case. Id. [footnotes omitted].
242. Id. at 915. For a discussion of these factors, see Note, supra note 19, at 371-76.
243. One commentator suggests that:
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VI. CONCLUSION
With the growing use of scientific evidence at trial, it has become
increasingly apparent that Illinois needs to develop a more consis-
tent and definitive standard of admissibility for scientific evidence.
The current Frye approach has failed to provide a uniform stan-
dard upon which both judges and attorneys can rely with confl-
dence. The relevancy approach is consistent with the Federal
Rules of Evidence and provides a simple and effective solution to
the problem. If courts take into account an array of factors when
determining probativeness, then the concerns of those who fear ad-
mission of unreliable evidence will be alleviated. Consequently, Il-
linois should consider adopting such an approach.
M. THADDEUS MURPHY
[t]he advantage of an analysis weighing factors going to probativeness and prej-
udice is that it enables the court to focus directly on the different concerns that
may be present in a particular case. The proponents of the Frye test voiced a
number of these legitimate concerns, but a majority-rule standard may be an
oversimplified and sometimes inadequate method of dealing with them.
Note, supra note 19, at 376.
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